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Abstract
We analyze monopoly power in a market for a complementary fossil resource like oil in a two
country/two period model with international trade in general equilibrium. Focusing on the
complex interplay of capital and resource market, we elaborate how these effects feed back
into the resource monopolist’s extraction decision. His level of knowledge about the economic
structure thereby plays a key role. The accumulation of own capital assets over time, together
with a recognized influence of extraction on the interest rate, can lead the monopolist to ac-
celerate or postpone extraction. Considering the interaction of resource market and global
capital accumulation poses an incentive for the monopolist to accelerate extraction and to
exploit the importers’ increased resource addiction in the future. The conservationist bias of
resource market power can be increased, dampened or reversed through the general equilib-
rium effects.
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1 Resource Monopoly in General Equilibrium
Over two centuries ago, the industrial revolution started when technical developments
provided more and more ways to substitute human labor force and animals in production
by fossil energy resources. And even after such a long period of unprecedented growth in
economic wealth and technological knowledge the availability of fossil energy resources
is still seen as a major driving force for economic growth and development in both
the industrialized world, as well as in emerging market economies. From an economic
perspective, the degree of complementarity between fossil energy resources and other
production factors, in particular capital and labor, at the macro level, is still enormous.
This is especially true for oil. The lively debates about peak oil, about the heavy
dependency of the industrial countries on the supply of oil, and about the drastic
consequences of a declining oil supply in the future can be considered as indications
of its great influence and importance. The substitutability of oil in the transportation
sector, especially with regard to freight and air transport, remains limited, in spite of
technological advancements of electric and natural gas engines for passenger cars. Along
the same lines, the macroeconomic development and growth paths of big economies and
the oil market are naturally treated as strongly interrelated in the debates of market
and policy analysts. For instance the oil price peak of 2008 is often explained by the
extraordinary growth in emerging markets like China. Overall, reductions in oil supply
or increases in the oil price affect the economy so strongly that it is hard to think of any
other production input factor or any other market with similarly widespread effects on
incomes, prices and expected returns.
To capture these broader effects of oil availability in a consistent model framework
we extend the standard partial equilibrium models of resource extraction to a general
equilibrium analysis where the overall equilibrium directly depends on the resource ex-
traction path over time. In particular, we are interested in how the influence on the
whole economy might feed back into the oil supply decision itself if it is not only im-
plicitly present via equilibrium market prices but explicitly taken into account by oil
suppliers. In contrast to a competitive market, this requires the single resource supplier
to be able to manipulate and adapt the overall oil supply to his own advantage, so that
we assume market power in the resource market. If we think of the geographical concen-
tration of resource stocks and oil suppliers with high market shares such as OPEC, the
assumption of resource market power does not seem unrealistic. For simplification – but
of course in contrast to the real world oil market – we consider a resource monopolist
instead of an oligopolistic (or competitive fringe) market structure.
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Combining these two aspects, the broader economic relevance of the resource in ques-
tion and market power in the resource market, raises the more general question of how
a resource monopolist might act in general equilibrium. Like the usual textbook mo-
nopolist, a resource monopolist takes into account the price and demand changes he
induces with his supply behaviour. But since the resource is exhaustible, the monopolist
optimizes supply not only for one period, as in a static model, but simultaneously for
all future periods up to exhaustion of his resource stock considering opportunity costs
of restrictions in period supply and following the classical Hotelling rule (cf. Dasgupta
and Heal (1979) or Stiglitz (1976)).
In general equilibrium, however, the investment returns, the capital accumulation dy-
namics, the future factor demand and future price reactions to changes in supply are
not exogenously given, but generally dependent on the specific equilibrium outcome,
which in turn is directly influenced by the monopolist’s supply decision. When ana-
lyzing a resource monopolist’s strategic behavior while at the same time extending the
standard partial equilibrium framework, it is therefore of key importance to consider
the monopolist’s level of awareness of oil’s prominent role and its overall effects on the
world economy. In principle, this holds true for every monopolist in general equilib-
rium. However, given the widely recognized importance of oil, we believe that it is
especially plausible for an oil supplier with market power to realize at least some of the
widespread effects of his supply decision. With our paper we want to create a better and
more realistic understanding of the behavior of an oil supplier with market power and
far-reaching influence compared to the standard Hotelling rule in partial equilibrium,
not least contributing to the design of more effective climate policy instruments.
We introduce a general equilibrium framework with a finite time horizon of two pe-
riods that mainly differs from the conventional partial equilibrium setting in resource
economics by including a capital market with an endogenous accumulation of physical
capital from the first to the second period, since the endogenous capital stock dy-
namics constitute the pivot of the various general equilibrium effects. Moreover, in a
two country setting we reproduce the typical asymmetry in resource endowments and
production technologies between resource exporting and importing countries where the
resource-rich country does not have any consumption good to sell apart from the natural
resource and where it “just” fuels the production and growth processes in the resource
importing country. As a consequence, the resource exporter transforms his resource
wealth into financial wealth to finance current consumption and to build up a capital
asset stock for future consumption. Due to the lack of investment options at home,
these funds are invested abroad. However, as we assume a perfect and competitive
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international capital market with globally uniform returns, we do not need to specify
where the capital savings of resource-exporters are invested. Real exporting countries
of fossil energy resources often dispose of considerable sovereign wealth funds following
the same logic. The funds of the United Arab Emirates ($ 1,078.5 billion) and Saudi
Arabia ($ 757 billion) being the two biggest such sovereign asset stocks among OPEC
countries (Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (2014)). Beyond official sovereign wealth
funds, all other kinds of petrodollar bank deposits are invested in some manner in the
capital market, very often in the industrialized countries.
From the linkage between resource supply and the capital market in general equilibrium
in our model follows that the resource-exporting country will have a direct influence on
the return of its accumulated capital funds. In contrast to Hillman and Long (1985),
this influence runs only via resource market power and explicitly not by assuming that
the resource monopolist has additionally capital market power. One of the most striking
results of our general equilibrium approach is this inherent new role of capital assets in
the resource monopolist’s strategy once he realizes that his oil supply has an influence
on the interest rate and the growth path (see sections 3.3 and 3.5.1).
On the one hand, this may be interpreted as an extension of conventional resource
market power. On the other hand, the dependency of capital returns on the availability
of resources constrains the resource exporter when he tries to exert market power in the
resource market. The often discussed dependency of the oil importers on the “good-
will” of key resource exporting countries therefore may not be as unilateral as expected
at first, but in fact mutual. In any case, recognizing his influence on the return of
petrodollar capital funds partly shifts the resource exporter’s focus from the resource
rents which he can receive from the resource-importing countries to their economic
performance.
In the following, we start by comprehensively introducing and interpreting the general
equilibrium framework. Since we aim to derive and interpret the optimal extraction pol-
icy depending on the monopolist’s state of awareness of the overall economic structure,
we first describe a conditional equilibrium, which solely depends on the extraction path
the monopolist chooses. Next, we vary the monopolist’s awareness of the transmission
channels of resource supply into the capital market in four steps. In scenario N (’naive’)
the monopolist’s knowledge is that of a partial equilibrium monopolist. In scenario NA
(’naive + assets’) awareness of his influence on the interest rate and the resulting cap-
ital asset motive is added to the monopolist’s considerations. In scenario G (’general
equilibrium knowledge’) the monopolist knows about the capital stock dynamics and
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uses this knowledge in his strategic ’addiction motive’, while the asset motive of sce-
nario NA is excluded again. Finally, in scenario GA (’general equilibrium knowledge
+ assets’) all previous aspects and levels of awareness are taken and analyzed together.
For each scenario, we derive a modified Hotelling rule or intertemporal non-arbitrage
condition which characterizes optimal resource supply over time. We compare these
different optimal extraction scenarios analytically, also with the standard monopoly
case, to gain intuition on the impact of the general equilibrium feedback effects and
on the impact of the specific level of awareness on optimal extraction. Since different
supply policies will not only lead to different extraction paths, but also to different
equilibrium outcomes, a full analytical comparison of all the scenarios is, however, not
feasible. To resolve these analytical ambiguities we employ a numerical simulation of
the model, which allows us to graphically illustrate the different scenarios and to derive
quantitative results. Finally, we shortly discuss the role of changes in the elasticity of
substitution between capital and the resource, which may be interpreted as a measure
of input efficiency in production and thereby of technological development.
For our analysis we take into account and build upon previous steps in the literature
from partial equilibrium to general equilibrium analysis of exhaustible resource extrac-
tion and supply. While Hoel (1981) introduced an influence of a resource monopolist’s
decision on the interest rate, this influence was still postulated in an otherwise partial
equilibrium model and unspecified, disregarding the associated capital stock dynamics.
Hassler et al. (2010) also incorporate an influence of the resource supplier on the capital
returns, but lack the intertemporal optimization of supply. Hillman and Long (1985)
bring forward a general equilibrium model, where the interest rate is freely chosen by
a resource exporter with market power on both, the resource and the capital market.
However, their model lacks the impact channel from resource extraction on the interest
rate directly over the physical production function, as well as the corresponding effect
of the capital stock dynamics on the interest rate over the production function and
all resulting repercussions. Thus, they leave this aspect of complementarity between
oil and physical capital in production out of the picture. Moreover, it’s exactly their
exporter’s free choice of the interest rate as an additional independent variable that
excludes the effects of resource supply behavior on the capital market (and the cor-
responding consequences), that naturally arise in our general equilibrium framework
and that we are interested in, from their model. Moussavian and Samuelson (1984)
incorporate an exhaustible resource monopolist’s influence on the capital accumulation
in their model. Our analysis of scenario G is consistent with this study and develops
it further, drawing additional conclusions. Besides the studies mentioned above, how-
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ever, a resource monopoly is usually, from Stiglitz (1976) to Fischer and Laxminarayan
(2005), analyzed with an exogenous and constant interest rate, as far as we know.
Gaitan et al. (2006) also see the necessity for dynamic general equilibrium models
and propose an own such contribution. But they focus on the case of isoelastic re-
source demand in a competitive resource market, not more general resource demand
and monopoly power. Van der Meijden et al. (2014) propose a two-country general
equilibrium setup, which is in many ways similar to ours, for the analysis of resource
and capital taxation effects with a focus on the Green Paradox. Their model features
perfect competition on the resouorce and capital markets, in contrast to our resource
monopoly. Long and Stähler (2014) also establish a dynamic general equilibrium model
in perfect competition: Their focus lies on the effects of technological change on the
interest rate and the consequences for the Green Paradox, i.e. a different effect channel
on the interest rate than the one we are looking at.
We start by introducing the model framework and by deriving equilibrium relationships
conditional on the chosen resource supply path in section 2. In section 3, we analyze the
optimal supply decision of a resource monopolist by distinguishing different scenarios
according to the monopolist’s level of awareness of the overall economic structure and
the widespread effects of his supply decision. We present a visualization of the analytical
results by use of an exemplary numerical simulation of the model in section 4 and briefly
discuss the crucial importance of the elasticity of substitution in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2 Model
Consider a two country setting consisting of a resource rich country E and the rest of
the world represented by country I with a finite time horizon of two periods t = 1, 2.
Country E owns the entire world stock of an exhaustible energy resource (“oil”) R¯
but has no production technologies to transform the resource into consumption goods
and/or physical capital. Country E therefore has to export the resource to trade in
final goods for household consumption. In contrast, country I produces final goods
for consumption but its production technology and thereby its economic development
(strongly) depend on the use of imported oil. We choose the consumption good as
numeraire and assume perfect substitutability between consumption goods and physical
capital.
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In total, the model comprises three (international) markets, the final goods market,
the resource market and the physical capital market. All agents can commit to their
first period decisions and have perfect foresight but asymmetric knowledge of economic
structures. Since we are interested in the importance of different levels of awareness of
the model’s economic structure for the monopolist’s optimal supply behavior, we aim to
describe the overall market equilibrium conditional on the resource supply path chosen.
The ultimate goal in the following section therefore is to derive market equilibria, in
particular market prices, as functions of resource supply only – just as in a partial
equilibrium framework where a monopolist optimizes supply for a given demand curve.
A monopolist knowing the complete economic structure of the model then will choose
resource supply by taking into account the general equilibrium reaction of market prices,
for example.
2.1 Country I
2.1.1 Consumption Goods Production: Firms in Country I
A large number of symmetric firms competitively produce consumption goods in country
I by the use of three input factors, the imported (fossil) energy resource Rt, physical
capital Kt and labour L. The firms merely observe market prices in each period and act
as price-takers. The labour input is supplied by the households at home and assumed
to be constant over time, so that we can suppress the time index t. Additionally we
assume full employment in each period.
The production technology F (Kt, Rt, L) is strictly concave with respect to each input
factor, constant over time and of CES-type so that
Ft = F (Kt, Rt) = A [γKαt + λRαt + (1− γ − λ)Lα]
1
α (1)
where A > 0 measures total factor productivity, −∞ < α < 1 and the constant
elasticity of substitution between the two variable input factors is given by
σ = − d ln
(
Kt
Rt
)
d ln
(
FtK
FtR
) = 11− α > 0
With Ftf , Ftff denoting the first and second derivative with respect to input factor f
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at period t, we therefore have
FtK , FtR > 0 and FtKK , FtRR < 0 (2)
Additionally, and crucial for the channels that we want to model, we assume at least
some complementarity between the input factors so that especially the cross derivative
of capital and resource input is strictly positive
FtKR = FtRK > 0 (3)
Note, that the given production technology is homogenous of degree 1 with respect to
all three input factors to ensure compatibility with a (long-term) competitive market
equilibrium for final goods. However, with respect to the only variable production
inputs capital and oil, final good production exhibits decreasing returns to scale, so
that (cf. Hillman and Long (1985))
Γ = FtRRFtKK − F 2tKR > 0 (4)
In competitive equilibrium and with overall constant returns to scale firms earn zero
profits. However, with respect to capital and oil only final good producers earn positive
profits
pitI = F (Kt, Rt, L)− ptRt − itKt (5)
which equal labour income (see e.g. van der Meijden et al. (2014)). For simplicity we
omit the fixed input factor L in the following.
Since consumption goods are produced competitively, factor demand for the variable
production factors Kdt , Rdt is derived from the first order conditions of profit maximiza-
tion for given (world) market prices of oil pt and capital it
FtR(Kt, Rdt ) = pt (6)
FtK(Kdt , Rt) = it (7)
Factor demands for oil and capital therefore are implicitly defined as functions of both
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market prices
Rdt = Rdt (pt, it) with dRdt =
FtKK
Γ dpt −
FtKR
Γ dit (8)
Kdt = Kdt (it, pt) with dKdt =
FtRR
Γ dit −
FtKR
Γ dpt (9)
Due to the concavity of the production function, the complementarity of capital and
the resource, and Γ > 0 from (4) capital and resource demand negatively depend on
both factor prices. For the first period the capital stock K1 is given, so that the market
interest rate i1 represents the factor price for capital for a completely inelastic capital
supply.
2.1.2 Households in Country I
Consider a representative household in country I with homothetic period utility from
final goods consumption ctI . With β = 11+ρ denoting the utility discount factor for time
preference rate ρ, life-time welfare of the household is given by
UI(c1I , c2I) = u(c1I) + βu(c2I) =

c1−η1I
1− η + β
c1−η2I
1− η for η < 1
ln c1I + β ln c2I for η = 1
(10)
where 1/η represents the constant elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Household income is derived from the fixed labour supply to final goods production
pitI . Additionally, for the first period, we assume that the household is endowed with
exogenous savings from the previous period s0I . Therefore, total period income, that
the household takes as given for its savings decision, is for the first period
y1I = pi1I + (1 + i1)s0I (11)
and pi2I from (5) for the second period. Note, that the household is also assumed
to correctly foresee (labour) income pi2I and the market interest rate i2 in the second
period.
The household maximizes life-time utility by optimally choosing savings in the first
period s1I , as to smooth first- and second-period consumption subject to the period
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constraints
c1I + s1I = y1I (12)
c2I = pi2I + (1 + i2)s1I (13)
Utility maximization then yields the familiar Euler equation
u′(c1I)
u′(c2I)
= β(1 + i2) (14)
The Euler equation in combination with the period budget constraints (12) and (13)
implicitly defines optimal first period capital savings
s1I = s1I(y1I , pi2I , i2) (15)
as a function of period income streams and the second period interest rate, i.e. the
return on savings. Totally differentiating the Euler equation and using households’
budget constraints in (12) and (13) yields the partial influence of changes in period
income streams and the interest rate on savings
∂s1I
∂y1I
= u
′′(c1I)
∆I
= [β (1 + i2)]
1
η
1 + i2 + [β (1 + i2)]
1
η
> 0
∂s1I
∂pi2I
= −β(1 + i2)u
′′(c2I)
∆I
= − 1
1 + i2 + [β (1 + i2)]
1
η
< 0
∂s1I
∂i2
= −βu
′(c2I)
∆I
+ ∂s1I
∂pi2I
s1I =
pi2I + (1 + i2) (1− η) s1I
η (1 + i2)
[
1 + i2 + [β (1 + i2)]
1
η
] ≷ 0
(16)
where ∆I = u′′(c1I) + β(1 + i2)2u′′(c2I) < 0. For homothetic prefences, the marginal
propensities to save with respect to period income are constant for a given interest rate
and do not depend on the income level of households.
The ambiguous influence of the interest rate i2 on savings is due to counteracting income
and substitution effects. On the one hand, a rising interest rate enlarges the consump-
tion possibilities of the household in the second period for given savings. This income
effect diminishes the incentive to save and is captured by the negative second term
∂s1I
∂pi2I
s1I above. On the other hand, the (opportunity) costs of first period consumption
(from foregone interest return) rise with an increase in the interest rate, creating an
incentive to substitute first period consumption for consumption in the second period
by increasing savings. This substitution effect is captured by the positive first term
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−β u′(c2I)∆I and counteracts the income effect in general. For homothetic preferences and
η ≤ 1 (including ln-utility), however, the generally ambiguous sign of the influence of
the interest rate on savings turns positive. For η = 1 income and substitution effect
of an increase in the interest rate exactly cancel out but the interest rate still has a
positive influence on savings due to the positive labour income of households in period
2 apart from capital income.
2.2 Country E
2.2.1 Resource Extraction
Extraction of the world stock of the fossil energy resource is controlled by the govern-
ment (or oil sheikh) in power in country E. We assume that the resource is scarce. This
implies that after period t2 reserves are exhausted and that aggregate resource supply
Rst is limited by the available stock R¯
Rs1 +Rs2 = R¯ (17)
There are no further resources to explore and to turn into reserves at any point in time
and oil extraction costs are assumed to be zero for simplicity.
2.2.2 Households in Country E
While countries differ with respect to their factor endowment and production capabil-
ities, we assume symmetric consumption preferences in both countries. As in coun-
try I, the representative household in country E therefore maximizes life-time utility
UE(c1E, c2E) given by (10) by optimally adjusting period consumption ctE via capital
savings s1E in period 1.
The household again has perfect foresight with regard to the market interest rate i2
and the resource income in both periods but no control over resource extraction and
supply decisions of the sheikh. In the end, the household simply reacts to the interest
rate and the income streams it observes. Thus, the savings decision of the household
in country E and the resource supply decision are in any case separated.
In contrast to country I, the household in country E does not derive income from labour
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supply but from resource revenues
pitE = ptRt (18)
which the sheikh earns in the resource market and (benevolently) distributes to the
households of his country.
When maximizing lifetime-utility the household therefore has to obey the period budget
constraints
c1E + s1E = y1E (19)
c2E = pi2E + (1 + i2)s1E (20)
where we define total first period income with given savings from the previous period
s0E as
y1E = pi1E + (1 + i1)s0E (21)
From the first-order condition, the Euler equation
u′(c1E)
u′(c2E)
= β(1 + i2) (22)
together with budget constraints (19) and (20) implicitly define optimal savings as a
function of income streams (exogenous to the savings decision) and the interest rate
s1E = s1E(y1E, pi2E, i2) (23)
where the marginal effects of changes in period income streams and the interest rate
are completely analogue to (16).
2.3 Capital Supply
Aggregate (world) capital supply Kst for final goods production in period t is derived
from the savings of both countries stm (m = I, E) from the previous period t− 1. We
assume that both countries are “small” in the capital market so that neither country
can exert market power in the capital market via its capital supply from household
savings.
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For period 1, savings or capital endowments, and therefore aggregate capital supply,
are exogenously given
Ks1 = s0I + s0E (24)
For period 2, aggregate capital supply is given by the savings from both countries. Given
that savings are functions of period income streams and the interest rate i2 according
to (15) and (23) we derive aggregate capital supply from the first period for second
period production as a function of the interest rate i2, the resource supply path and
aggregated endowments of capital and resources
Ks2 = Ks2(i2, R2, R¯,K1) (25)
On the one hand we show in appendix A.1.1 that period income streams y1m and pi2m
for country m = I, E, which influence the savings decision of households, are in the end
functions of factor prices, capital endowments s0E, s0I and resource supply R1, R2. On
the other hand, we also more extensively discuss in appendix A.1.2 that for symmetric
homothetic preferences, the distribution of income between both countries has no influ-
ence on aggregated savings which is due to the constant marginal savings propensities
with respect to income changes that are independent of the respective income level
(see (16)). In particular, this implies that factor price changes for given factor inputs,
i.e. for overall constant output and aggregated income, lead to a redistribution of ag-
gregated income between production factors and thereby, in our asymmetric country
setting, also between countries but do not influence savings. Using (16) we also derive
in the appendix that for symmetric homothetic preferences
dKs2 =
(
∂s1I
∂i2
+ ∂s1E
∂i2
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2
)
di2 +
(
∂s1E
∂pi2E
p2 − ∂s1E
∂y1E
p1
)
dR2
+ ∂s1I
∂y1I
p1dR¯ +
∂s1I
∂y1I
i1dK1
(26)
Note that we already use the resource constraint (17) to set R1 = R¯ − R2 and dR1 =
−dR2 which has to hold in any case per assumption. The changes in aggregated capital
and resource endowments are included for completeness.
The influence of the interest rate on aggregated capital supply is due to the pure (ag-
gregated) substitution effect in the savings decisions. A rising interest rate in principle
also leads to increases in second period capital income in both countries as we discussed
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in the previous sections. However, for given resource prices, these income effects rep-
resent just a redistribution from labour to capital income. The loss in labour income
which is captured by the term − ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2 completely offsets the capital income gains
which therefore are completely neutral with respect to the savings decision for symmet-
ric homothetic preferences. Using (16), the aggregated substitution effect in (26) can
be stated as
∂s1I
∂i2
+ ∂s1E
∂i2
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2 =
dKs2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,K1
> 0 (27)
where the notation explicitly points out that the resource extraction path is assumed
to be constant and unaffected by the increase in the interest rate here.
The second term in (26) captures the effect that an increase in aggregate future income
has on capital supply when resources are reallocated to the future but capital stocks
and market prices are held constant. Correspondingly, using the above notation we
may summarize this aggregated income effect on total savings by writing
∂s1E
∂pi2E
p2 − ∂s1E
∂y1E
p1 =
dKs2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2,K1
< 0 (28)
A marginal shift of resources to the second period increases aggregated income in pe-
riod 2 by the marginal productivity of resources given by p2 = F2R according to (6)
and correspondingly reduces aggregated income in period 1 by p1. Due to symmetric
homothetic preferences, the aggregated impact savings only depends on the overall in-
come redistribution and not on where period incomes change. However, with constant
returns to scale country E is able to completely capture the production value of its
resource supply so that the aggregated income effect is driven by the induced change
in savings from country E.
2.4 Conditional Market Equilibrium
We now combine the different elements discussed in the previous sections to describe the
market equilibrium of the world economy. We characterize the equilibrium conditional
on the resource supply path. Of course, for the overall equilibrium the optimal supply
policy of the resource monopolist is still missing. However, by deriving the equilibrium
outcome conditional only on the resource supply chosen by the monopolist, the concept
of the conditional market equilibrium will allow us to discuss the supply policy of
the monopolist depending on his level of awareness of the more widespread effects of
resource supply in general equilibrium and, in particular, of the interrelation of resource
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and capital market.
In the following, we first summarize the conditions which define the conditional equilib-
rium on the capital market, the resource market and the final good’s market. Second,
we provide a comparative static analysis of this conditional equilibrium with respect to
changes of the resource supply path.
2.4.1 Capital Market Equilibrium
From (7), capital demand of producing firms is a function of factor prices. Whereas
capital supply is exogenously given for the first period by capital endowmentK1, second
period capital supply with symmetric homothetic preferences is a function of the interest
rate, resource supply and capital endowment according to (25). In capital market
equilibrium, we therefore must have
Kd1 (i1, p1) =K1 (29)
Kd2 (i2, p2) =Ks2(i2, R2, R¯,K1) (30)
Note that for the second period’s capital supply we already take into account the re-
source constraint (17) here which is assumed to be binding in any case.
2.4.2 Resource Market Equilibrium
Resource demand is derived from the production of final goods in country I under
competition as a function of factor prices according to (6). For the conditional mar-
ket equilibrium, resource supply is not characterized by a specific supply policy but
just taken as given. However, for any equilibrium resource supply path (R1, R2) the
resource constraint has to hold by assumption. Resource market equilibrium, therefore,
is characterized by the market clearing conditions
Rd1(p1, i1) =R1 (31)
Rd2(p2, i2) =R2 (32)
for each period. Additionally, equilibrium factor prices are such that
R1 +R2 = Rd1(i1, p1) +Rd2(i2, p2) = R¯
14
holds intertemporally according to (17).
The actual market equilibrium of course also depends on the supply decision of the
monopolist which we aim to derive later on. Note, however, that these market clearing
conditions will be met in any case as long as the monopolist will optimize his supply
over time for the given resource demand functions and for the resource stock available.
This holds true independent of the level of awareness we assume the monopolist to have
with respect to the economic structures.
2.4.3 Final Goods’ Market Equilibrium
In equilibrium, aggregate consumption and savings of households in both countries must
not exceed aggregate consumption possibilities given by the output Ft and the capital
stock Kt in each period, i.e. the aggregate budget constraints for the world have to
hold for given first-period capital stock K1
c1I + c1E +K2 = F1 +K1 (33)
c2I + c2E = F2 +K2 (34)
Note that since we assume symmetric consumption preferences the country specific
Euler equations 14 and 22 have to hold for aggregate consumption, too. Thus
c1I
c2I
= c1E
c2E
= c1I + c1E
c2I + c2E
= [β(1 + i2)]−
1
η
The Euler equation therefore also defines an intertemporal final goods market equilib-
rium (cf. van der Meijden et al. (2014)), i.e. we have
c1I + c1E
c2I + c2E
= [β(1 + i2)]−
1
η = F1 +K1 −K2
F2 +K2
in equilibrium. From Walras’ law we can, however, conclude, that the final goods’
market will be in equilibrium whenever the capital and the resource market are in
equilibrium.1
1Also note that capital supply is directly derived from the Euler equations (14) and (22).
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2.4.4 Comparative Statics of the Conditional Market Equilibrium
We now conduct a comparative static analysis of the conditional market equilibrium
defined by the market clearance conditions (30), (31), (32) and (33) with respect to
the resource supply path in order to illustrate the overall influence of the monopolist’s
extraction decision on the equilibrium outcome. In particular, we aim to characterize
how market prices for capital and the resource in both periods as well as the second
period capital stock depend on second period resource supply in equilibrium taking into
account that the resource constraint (17) must hold.
For the first period, the capital stock is exogenously given by capital endowments and
therefore independent of changes in the resource supply path. Totally differentiating
the capital and resource market equilibrium conditions (29) and (31) using (7) and (6)
and taking into account dR1 = −dR2 by the resource constraint (17) yields
dp1
dR2
= ∂p1
∂R1
dR1
dR2
= −F1RR > 0 (35)
di1
dR2
= ∂i1
∂R1
dR1
dR2
= −F1KR < 0 (36)
Since there is no feedback effect from a change in the capital stock, there is obviously
just a direct influence of resource supply on factor prices via the induced change in the
marginal product of the respective production factor in final goods production.
For the second period, we again totally differentiate the market equilibrium conditions
(32) and (30) and solve for the equilibrium reaction of the factor prices to a shift of
resources from the first to the second period. We show in appendix A.2.1 that the
resource price still negatively reacts according to
dp2
dR2
=
F2RR − Γ dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
+ F2KR dK
s
2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
1− F2KK dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
= F2RR + F2RK
dK2
dR2
< 0
(37)
The negative sign can be observed from the first line and arises due to strict concavity
of the production technology, which gives Γ > 0 according to (4), and the unambiguous
signs of the induced substitution and income effects of aggregate savings according to
(27) and (28). (37) measures the total resource price reaction to a change in the whole
extraction path, i.e. including dR1 = −dR2, not only to an isolated increase in second
period supply and separates the direct effect, given by the first term in the second line,
16
from the indirect general equilibrium feedback effect of a change in the resource supply
path. Correspondingly, (37) can be interpreted as the slope of the general equilibrium
inverse resource demand curve which consists of the conventional/direct negative effect
for a given inverse resource demand curve and of a shift of the overall inverse demand
curve induced. Whereas the direct effect, as well as the overall effect, are negative,
the feedback effect from capital accumulation may dampen or reinforce the standard
partial equilibrium direct price effect depending on the general equilibrium effect of the
second period resource supply on the capital stock.
Similarly, the interest rate still increases with a postponement of extraction:
di2
dR2
=
F2KR + F2KK dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
1− F2KK dK2di2
∣∣∣
R2
= F2KR + F2KK
dK2
dR2
> 0
(38)
This is the case, even though we account for the endogenous saving reactions of house-
holds in both countries and while these savings reactions or, more specifically, the reac-
tion of aggregate capital supply are not necessarily unambiguous due to counteracting
income and substitution effects (cf. (27) and (28)).2 In the second line of (38) we again
separate the partial complementarity effect of resource supply from the general equi-
librium feedback effect that results from the induced change in capital accumulation.
As before, the general equilibrium feedback effect might increase or dampen the partial
complementarity effect but cannot reverse its overall positive sign which again arises
from the strict concavity of the production technology and the induced unambiguous
income and substitution effects in aggregate savings.
The second line in (37) and (38) is derived by using the decomposition of the overall
induced change in the second period capital stock into the aggregate substitution ((27))
and the aggregate income ((28)) effects that arise from a change in the extraction
pattern and a thus change in the interest rate i2
dK2
dR2
= dK
s
2
dR2
= dK
s
2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
+ dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
di2
dR2
(39)
This decomposition can be observed from (26) where we set dK1
dR2
= 0 and dR¯
dR2
= 0 for
given (exogenous) capital and resource endowments. With the equilibrium change in
2Recall that the unambiguous positive sign of the substitution effect again is due to our assumption
of symmetric homothetic preferences.
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the interest rate from (38) and since the aggregated income effect from (28) was derived
by accounting for the resource constraint (17), the induced change in aggregate capital
supply gives the equilibrium change in the capital stock.
The main difference between the given general equilibrium framework and a partial
equilibrium setting is therefore introduced by the feedback via the capital accumula-
tion. Generally, the aggregate substitution and income effects from (28) and (27) are
counteracting so that the sign of dK2
dR2
depends on the sign of di2
dR2
and is ambiguous
as we have di2
dR2
> 0 from (38).3 However, the negative aggregated income effect from
shifting resources from the present to the future period (cf. dK2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
in (28)) dominates
the positive aggregated substitution effect of an increase in the interest rate (cf. dK2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
in (27)) if4
1
ση
<
(1 + i2)F2
i2F2 + i2K2
{
[β(1 + i2)]
1
η
p1
p2
+ 1
}
(40)
Since the right side is larger than unity, a sufficient condition for a negative relationship
between postponing extraction and the second period capital stock is
ση ≥ 1 (41)
When resources are shifted to the second period, the production possibilities and
thereby the world income will increase at the expense of the first period. Both, the
decrease of first period income and the increase in the second period income, tend to
reduce savings. With a high elasticity of substitution – and a low complementarity be-
tween capital and the resource (3) – a postponement of extraction boosts second period
production and income even with a lower capital stock. For a high η, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution (1/η) is rather low and households’ savings are rather
insensitive to a change in the interest rate. This implies that the savings incentive from
the increase in the interest rate, which a postponement of extraction induces according
to (38), is rather weak and at the same time likely to be overcompensated by the effect
on savings from the intertemporal redistrubtion of income.
For intuitive reasons, we assume the sufficient condition (41) to hold in the following.
3Recall that the overall capital stock is unaffected by the distribution of income (and resource
rents) between both countries, for a given resource supply path, due to our assumption of symmetric
homothetic preferences in both countries.
4See appendix A.2.2 for the derivation of this condition. In the appendix, we also include a figure
taken from the numerical simulation of the model which shows the equilibrium sensitivity of second
period capital stock and interest rate as a function of R2.
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Whenever resources are shifted from the first to the second period, a fall in the future
capital stocks seems to be much more in line with economic history and the current
world economy. For example, industrialized production and capital accumulation in
the 19th century heavily relied on the use of fossil (energy) resources, i.e. by using
fossil resources people were in a much better position to save and to build up capital
stocks. Moreover, even at present an unexpected drop in fossil resource supply would
most probably still lead to a decreasing world output and not to an increase in capital
accumulation, especially not in physical capital accumulation, which we have in mind
here.
Nevertheless, even if we assume that ση ≥ 1 holds and dK2
dR2
< 0 according to (41)
the equilibrium overall savings reaction with the partial effects given for the respective
country by (16)
ds1m
dR2
= ∂s1m
∂y1m
∂y1m
∂R1
dR1
dR2
+ ∂s1m
∂pi2m
∂pi2m
∂R2
+ ∂s1m
∂i2
di2
dR2
for country m = I, E (42)
is of ambiguous sign, in general. In contrast to the overall capital accumulation, the
signs of the savings reactions of each country depend on the distribution of wealth be-
tween both countries and thereby on the distribution of capital endowments as well as
on the resource rents that country E can earn by exerting market power. We demon-
strate this ambiguity in more detail in appendix A.2.3 where we also include a figure
which illustrates the relationship between second period resource supply and savings in
both countries as well as the capital stock in equilibrium in the numerical simulation we
introduce and use for the discussion of the different supply scenarios in the following.
3 The Resource Monopolist’s Optimal Extraction
Path
In section 2 we characterized the general equilibrium of the model conditional on the
monopolist’s resource supply decision, in particular by deriving the resource price reac-
tion (38) and the interest rate reaction (37) to changes in the resource extraction path.
We now turn to the optimal resource supply decision of the monopolist, i.e. of country
E, to characterize and interpret the overall (and no longer conditional) equilibrium of
the model.
In a standard partial equilibrium setting, a monopolist exerts market power typically by
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choosing supply for a given (inverse) demand curve as to maximize his objective func-
tion. In contrast to competitive suppliers, a monopolist therefore directly accounts for
market price reactions when he optimizes supply. Obviously, this requires the monop-
olist to know about the price-quantity relation that is defined by demand. In a general
equilibrium setting, however, we know from the introduction of the model framework in
section 2 that there are additional effects of the supply decision that can feed back into
the resource market. Naturally, as far as these additional effects have implications for
his objective function, the monopolist should account for them. However, this requires
the monopolist to actually know about these additional effects which implies that the
monopolist is aware of the underlying economic structures.
In a general equilibrium setting, the level of awareness of the economic structures there-
fore will determine what the monopolist considers optimal. For example, it depends on
the monopolist’s level of awareness whether he takes into account the overall general
equilibrium resource price effect (37) of his supply decision or whether he neglects the
feedback via the capital market and just accounts for the standard (partial) reaction of
the resource price. Note that the additional general equilibrium transmission effects are
still present and still influence the equilibrium outcome, even if the monopolist is not
explicitly aware of them. In this case, the monopolist just cannot actively use them to
his own advantage but observes equilibrium outcomes like a price taker in a competitive
market.
In the following, to assess the importance of the various aspects of the monopolist’s
knowledge for optimal resource supply, we change his scope of information about the
structure of the world economy, i.e. about various effects of resource supply that are
introduced via the endogeneity of the capital market equilibrium and future resource
demand. We start by deriving the characterization of optimal resource supply if the
monopolist is indeed aware of the overall economic structure so that he realizes and
internalizes all the widespread effects of his supply decision in general equilibrium.
Given this overall equilibrium, we analyze how the equilibrium outcome will change
as soon as we restrict the monopolist’s awareness. Due to the additive structure of
the first order condition that characterizes optimal resource supply, we can directly
link assumptions about the monopolist’s awareness of single effects to specific terms
in the first order condition. Therefore, apart from the full knowledge scenario, we can
distinguish three different scenarios by suppressing the corresponding terms in the first
order condition for optimal resource supply.
First (scenarioN), we consider a monopolist who only accounts for the resource market’s
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Without
Capital Assets
With
Capital Assets
Partial
Equilibrium
Thinking
Scenario N :
Naive Monopolist
Scenario NA:
Naive Monopolist with
Asset Motive
General
Equilibrium
Thinking
Scenario G:
General Equilibrium
Monopolist
(Oil Addiction Motive)
Scenario GA:
General Equilibrium
Monopolist with Asset
Motive
(Omniscient Monopolist)
Table 1: Overview over the four scenarios
specific effects of his extraction decision, just as in a conventional partial equilibrium
framework. Second (scenario NA), the monopolist is still assumed to base his overall
supply decision on partial equilibrium information but now he knows about the pro-
duction side/technology in the resource importing country. Hence, the monopolist is
aware of the complementarity of fossil resources and capital in final goods production
and thereby of the positive and instantaneous impact of resource supply on the return
on capital assets. This enables the monopolist to pursue a so called asset motive as a
second strategic motive of exerting market power in addition to the standard own price
effect on infra-marginal resource units sold. In a third scenario (scenario G), the mo-
nopolist recognizes the influence of the resource extraction path on the accumulation of
capital and the dependency of future resource demand on the capital stock from which
the so called addiction motive may arise. At the same time and in contrast to the sec-
ond case NA, we assume that the monopolist does not understand his influence on the
interest rate. By isolating the different strategic motives of resource extraction – the
asset motive and the addiction motive – this differentiation allows us to compare the
equilibrium outcomes and thereby analyze the fully informed monopolist’s extraction
decision more intuitively. Scenario GA is then the full general equilibrium knowledge
without any suspended terms. An overview over the scenarios is presented in table 1.
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3.1 Optimal Resource Supply: Full General Equilibrium
Think of a sheikh5, who controls resource extraction in country E and benevolently
distributes resource revenues (18) back to his people. The sheikh as a benevolent planner
knows about the households’ consumption preferences (10) and savings behavior as
characterized by (22) and is fully aware of the economic structure of the world economy.
Given these assumptions, the benevolent sheikh chooses the resource supply path (R1, R2)
as to maximize life-time utility of the representative household in country E (10)
max
R1,R2
U(c1E; c2E) = u(c1E) + βu(c2E) =
c1−η1E
1− η + β
c1−η2E
1− η
Thereby, the sheikh has to obey the binding resource constraint (17) and knows about
the budget constraints of the representative household in his country (19) and (20).
Due to his level of awareness and information, the omniscient monopolist also explicitly
takes into account that the conditional market equilibrium from section 2.4.1 holds.
More specifically, the sheikh is aware of the total influence of his resource supply on the
conditional market equilibrium. Following the concept of the familiar monopoly model,
the sheikh therefore accounts not only for the partial resource price change but for the
reactions of factor market prices in conditional equilibrium in both periods, i.e. for dp1
dR2
from (35) and di1
dR2
from (36) for the first period as well as dp2
dR2
from (37) and di2
dR2
from
(38) for the second period.
The overall optimal extraction path from the sheikh’s perspective, is then characterized
by the first-order condition
u′(c1E)
[
−
(
p1 +
∂p1
∂R1
)
− ∂i1
∂R1
s0E − ds1E
dR2
]
+ βu′(c2E)
[
p2 +
dp2
dR2
R2 + s1E
di2
dR2
+ (1 + i2)
ds1E
dR2
]
= 0
The sheikh only has an indirect influence on savings via his extraction policy as house-
holds in country E separately decide on savings given some distribution of period in-
comes y1E, pi2E (exogenous to the savings decision) and the interest rate i2. The latter
implies, however, that the Euler equation (22) will hold for any distribution of period
incomes and any interest rate in equilibrium and therefore for any resource extraction
path. Thus, we can substitute for the marginal utilities from the Euler equation and
5or any other benevolent authority in country E.
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finally characterize optimal resource supply as
(1 + iGA∗2 )MRGA∗1 = MRGA∗2 (43)
where we define the marginal resource value from the sheikh’s perspective – the modified
marginal resource revenue – if he is fully informed about the underlying economic
structure as
MRGAt = MRGAt (Kt, Rt) = pt +
dpt
dRt
Rt +
dit
dRt
s(t−1)E (44)
In the first period, the factor market price reactions to a change in resource supply
are given by the partial effects dp1
dR1
= ∂p1
∂R1
= F1RR and di1dR1 =
∂i1
∂R1
= F1KR as the
capital stock K1 is exogenously given. For the second period, the sheikh, due to his
comprehensive level of awareness, takes into account the total change in factor prices
in equilibrium as defined by (38) and (37).6 Given that households always will save
optimally, the resource extraction policy cannot increase life-time utility of households
in country E via all the indirect effects on savings summarized in ds1E
dR2
from (42), in
line with the Envelope theorem. Therefore, all these indirect effects cancel out. We
may interpret condition (43) as a modified Hotelling rule for a omniscient monopolist in
general equilibrium. The optimal equilibrium extraction path that is implicitly defined
by (43) is denoted as (RGA∗1 , RGA∗2 ) and correspondingly all equilibrium variable values
for this scenario are labeled with “xGA∗”.
Alternatively, we could consider the benevolent sheikh as an omnipotent social planner
for country E if the sheikh is assumed to make the savings decision on his own instead
of taking the households’ decision as given. However, since households also have perfect
foresight and in equilibrium always save optimally according to (22) for any extraction
path, the social planner could not improve the outcome of the benevolent sheikh. Note
that this holds true as long as the planner cannot exert market power in the capital
market by his savings decision. However, to focus just on the effect of resource market
power we explicitly excluded capital market power. For an analysis of a resource mo-
nopolist with additional capital market power in general equilibrium see Hillman and
Long (1985).
We examine the existence of equilibria for the different scenarios, which are defined by
the respective Hotelling-type condition, in the appendix B.4. In general, an equilibrium
6Note that these equilibrium reactions hold for changes in the overall extraction path, i.e. only for
an intertemporal reallocation of the given resource stock, and cannot be interpreted for an isolated
increase in second period resource supply.
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is stable if we have (1 + i2)MRGA1 > MRGA2 for a too high resource extraction in the
future period and (1 + i2)MRGA1 < MRGA2 for a too high resource extraction in the
present. In each case, the sheikh then has an incentive to reallocate resource extraction
towards the equilibrium. Considering both sides of (43) as functions of R2, this stability
criterion implies that the slope of the left side is steeper than the slope of the right side
in the equilibrium.
In the following we will develop the interpretation of the modified Hotelling rule (43)
and the corresponding extraction path from the discussion of different scenarios where
the sheikh is constrained in his awareness of some or all of the more widespread effects
of his supply decision in the general equilibrium framework at hand.
3.2 Scenario N: A ’Naive’ Monopolist
We start with the most restrictive scenario. Assume that the sheikh does not realize the
more widespread effects of his supply decision at all. The sheikh is “naive” (Moussavian
and Samuelson (1984)) in the sense that he completely neglects the endogeneity of
capital accumulation and second period resource demand and their dependency on the
resource extraction path he directly chooses. Instead, the sheikh takes the second period
capital stockK2 and thereby resource demand as exogenously given for both periods and
consequently also does not recognize the influence of resource supply on the interest rate
it for periods t = 1, 2. With these assumptions the sheikh effectively has a conventional
partial equilibrium thinking. Since from the naive sheikh’s perspective dK2
dR2
= 0 and
di2
dR2
= 0 in (43), the optimal resource supply is characterized by the condition
(1 + iN∗2 )MRN∗1 = MRN∗2 (45)
for given capital stocks K1 and K2, where we define
MRNt = MRNt (Kt, Rt) = pt +
∂pt
∂Rt
Rt =
pt
σ
[θtR − (1− σ)] (46)
The last transformation holds for the CES production technology (1) in resource market
equilibrium (cf. (6)) and θtf = FtffFt denotes the share of total output which factor f
captures as remuneration.
Maximizing life-time utility of the representative household by choice of the resource
extraction path is equivalent to maximizing the present-value of life-time income for the
household, as the sheikh does not take into account the additional effects of resource
24
supply on households’ period income via the interest rate and on the capital stock. We
could equivalently assume that the resource is extracted by a private firm in country
E.7
Condition (45) requires an increase in the marginal value of the resource. The gen-
eral equilibrium transmission channels influence the equilibrium outcome so that this
increase may derive from the resource supply pattern over time as well as from the
change in the capital stock, or a combination of both. Due to the concavity of the CES
technology from (1), we have
∂MRNt
∂Rt
∣∣∣∣∣
Kt
= 2− σ
σ
[
θtR − 1− σ2− σ
]
∂pt
∂Rt
< 0 for all σ > 0 (47)
and
∂MRNt
∂Kt
∣∣∣∣∣
Rt
= FtRK
FtRR
∂MRNt
∂Rt
∣∣∣∣∣
Kt
> 0 for all σ > 0 (48)
given that the monopolist has chosen supply such that MRNt > 0.8
3.2.1 Comparison with Perfect Competition
In the following, we analyze the naive monopolist’s solution in more detail by compar-
ison with the competitive outcome. Since an explicit solution for the optimal supply
path defined by the modified Hotelling rule is generally not feasible, we first hold the
capital stock fixed and focus on the effect of market power. In the next section, we
consider the influence of capital accumulation on the optimal extraction path both for
the monopolistic and the competitive case in more detail.
Without capital accumulation – the special case of a fixed capital stock K1 = K2 in our
model framework –the inverse demand pt(Kt, Rt) is given by the same function for both
7In fact, from maximizing the present value of resource revenues pitE
max
R2
pi1E +
pi2E
1 + i2
s.t. R1 = R¯−R2
again condition (49) follows for given resource demand functions and a given second-period market
interest rate i2, i.e. for a naive private monopolist with perfect foresight. This equivalency also arises
in Hillman and Long (1985) where in contrast to the model at hand the supply and savings decisions
are not made separately by two distinct agents but by the authority controlling the resource supply.
8For MRNt ≤ 0, the resource would not be scarce at least from the monopolist’s perspective. In
this case, the given resource stock would no longer constrain the monopolist in his supply decision
over both periods and the dynamic setting effectively would be reduced to the static case where profit
maximization without production costs always leads the monopolist to supply such that MRNt = 0.
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periods. Moreover, for the comparison with the competitive outcome, it proves useful
to rearrange the naive monopolist’s solution (45) to
1 + iN∗2 =
MRN2 (K2, R∗2)
MRN1 (K1, R∗1)
(49)
For constant capital stocks we know from (47) that condition (49) can only be met for
a decreasing resource supply path. In fact, by holding the capital stock constant, we
effectively replicate the well-known partial equilibrium analysis of monopolistic resource
supply (see Stiglitz (1976)).
In the competitive market equilibrium, the overall market extraction path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 )
is characterized by the Hotelling condition (see e.g. Dasgupta and Heal (1979))
1 + iC∗2 =
p2(K2, RC∗2 )
p1(K1, RC∗1 )
(50)
Comparing both Hotelling conditions for constant capital stocks brings us to the fol-
lowing proposition which reproduces the results of Stiglitz (1976).
Proposition 1. With a constant capital stock over time the monopolist will choose a
more (less) conservationist extraction path compared to the competitive market outcome
if σ < 1 (σ > 1). For iso-elastic demand or σ = 1, the monopolistic and competitive
extraction path coincide.
Even though both the monopolist and competitive resource suppliers will completely
exhaust the resource stock and thereby choose the same total market supply if the
resource is indeed scarce, the speed of extraction may differ due to the resource mar-
ket power. In fact, the growth of the marginal resource revenue in the monopolistic
equilibrium generally does not only derive from the growth of resource market prices
over time as for the competitive case, but also from changes in the price elasticity of
resource demand Rt,pt . This can be observed by rearranging marginal resource revenue
MRNt to
MRNt = pt
(
1 + ∂pt
∂Rt
Rt
pt
)
= pt
(
1 + 1
Rt,pt
)
where the price elasticity of demand Rt,pt is (negatively) defined for the CES-technology
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from (1)9
Rt,pt =
1
FtRR
Rt
FtR
= − σ1− θtR < 0 (51)
In general, the change in the price elasticity of resource demand which is directly induced
by resource supply for a fixed capital stock depends on the elasticity of substitution
∂Rt,pt
∂Rt
∣∣∣∣∣
Kt
= σ − 1
σ
FtR
Ft
Rt,pt R 0 for σ Q 1 (52)
To assess the influence of market power on the extraction path, we evaluate the monop-
olistic Hotelling rule (49) for the optimal competitive extraction path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ). Since
the Hotelling rule (50) for the competitive outcome holds per assumption, we have
1 + 1
R2,p2
1 + 1
R1,p1
R 1 or R2,p2 Q R1,p1 (53)
so that any inequality in (49) derives from the induced change in the price elasticity
of demand between both periods.10 Since the optimal competitive extraction path
(RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) decreases for constant capital stocks we can conclude from (52) that
R2,p2 Q R1,p1 for σ Q 1
For σ = 1, i.e. for the special case of a Cobb-Douglas production technology, resource
demand is iso-elastic. In this case, the marginal resource market revenue is directly
proportional to the market prices so that the monopolistic and the competitive extrac-
tion paths clearly coincide completely (Stiglitz (1976)). If the absolute value of the
price elasticity of demand falls in R or σ < 1,11 (47) implies that the monopolist –
starting from the competitive extraction path – has an incentive to shift resources to
the second period to meet condition (49) and thereby to slow down extraction. This
result motivates the famous suggestion of the monopolist being “the conservationist’s
best friend” (Solow (1974), referring to Hotelling (1931)). In contrast, if the absolute
value of the price elasticity of demand increases in R for σ > 1,12 the monopolistic
9The price elasticity of demand is always negative because the share of production factor f ’s remu-
neration in total output θtf = FtRRtFt cannot exceed unity by definition.10Note that the price elasticity of demand is negatively defined according to (51).
11i.e. as the price elasticity is negatively defined here, if ∂Rt,pt∂Rt
∣∣∣
Kt
> 0 and therefore σ < 1.
12i.e. if ∂Rt,pt∂Rt
∣∣∣
Kt
< 0 and therefore σ > 1.
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equilibrium is characterized by an even stronger decreasing supply path compared to
the competitive case.
3.2.2 The Role of Capital Accumulation
To focus on the pure effect of market power on the optimal extraction path and the
equilibrium outcome respectively we so far assumed constant capital stocks over time
and thereby effectively removed one of the main differences between a partial equi-
librium setting and the general equilibrium setting introduced before. However, the
capital stock generally is very likely to change over time. We want to focus on positive
capital accumulation over time, in the following, so that K2 > K1. Due to the com-
plementarity of fossil resources and capital the resource will be more valuable with a
higher capital stock so that there is an upward shift in the (inverse) resource demand.
Regarding resource extraction under competition, at least part of the resource market
price increase from period 1 to period 2, which is necessary for the competitive Hotelling
condition (50) to hold, results from the upward shift of resource demand. Compared to
the standard case with a fixed demand curve (i.e. fixed capital stocks) over time, positive
capital accumulation therefore tends to raise future resource extraction. If capital
accumulation is sufficiently high, this extraction shift might even lead to an increasing
competitive supply path over time. This holds also true for the naive monopolist as
marginal revenue increases with capital ((48)).
Note that an increase in the second period capital stock will also lead to a lower equilib-
rium interest rate i2 ceteris paribus, i.e. given the initially optimal competitive supply
path for constant capital stocks, again due to the concavity of the CES production
technology. This decrease in the interest rate additionally strengthens the incentives
for competitive resource suppliers to postpone extraction (cf. van der Meijden et al.
(2014)). In the general equilibrium framework, any shift of resources to the second
period will also influence capital accumulation itself according to 4 and the equilibrium
interest rate according to (38). However, even though these feedback effects dampen
the impact of capital accumulation on the equilibrium extraction path, they cannot re-
verse the qualitative result that competitive and monopolistic extraction will be slowed
down compared to a setting with constant capital stocks.
Nevertheless, given that both the monopolist and the competitive market tend to in-
crease second period resource supply, we cannot exclude that capital accumulation may
reverse the conclusions about the comparison between the naive monopolist and the
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competitive market outcome summarized in proposition 1. We know from the previous
section that given (47) the monopolistic extraction bias is directly linked to the devel-
opment of the price elasticity of demand over time for any given competitive extraction
path (cf. (53)). With capital accumulation the price elasticity of demand changes due
to the modified competitive extraction path, which we take as reference to characterize
the monopolistic extraction bias, but also due to the influence of the higher capital
stock. We summarize our results on the comparison between the naive monopolist and
the competitive outcome with capital accumulation in the the following proposition 2.
Proposition 2. With capital accumulation, naive monopoly power still leads to an
extraction shift to the future compared to the competitive equilibrium ("conservationist’s
best friend") if RC∗1 > RC∗2 and σ < 1. However, if capital accumulation leads to
RC∗1 < R
C∗
2 , the monopolistic bias is ambiguous. A similar ambiguity arises for negative
capital accumulation K1 > K2.
The effect of capital accumulation on the price elasticity of demand is given by
∂Rt,pt
∂Kt
∣∣∣∣∣
Rt
= (σ − 1) θtR
FtK
Ft
(1− θtR)2
Q 0 for σ Q 1. (54)
and crucially depends on the elasticity of substitution σ. The overall positive influence
of capital accumulation on marginal revenue MRNt according to (48) therefore derives
from two distinct, and sometimes counteracting, effects as rearranging shows
∂MRNt
∂Kt
∣∣∣∣∣
Rt
= FtRK
(
1 + 1
Rt,pt
)
− FtR
2Rt,pt
∂Rt,pt
∂Kt
∣∣∣∣∣
Rt
> 0 (55)
The first term on the right captures the induced upward shift in (inverse) resource de-
mand in Rt-pt-space that also drives the postponement of the extraction in the compet-
itive case. For σ < 1, i.e. if capital and the resource are complementary in production,
the second term on the right adds positively to the first. For σ > 1, the second term
contributes negatively to the overall positive effect of capital accumulation on MRNt
from (48).13
From comparing (52) and (54) we can conclude that the effect of capital accumulation
on the (negatively defined) price elasticity of resource demand is exactly contrary to
the effect of resource supply for any given elasticity of substitution σ 6= 1. If we have
13Note, that for σ > 1 resources and capital are substitutes in production. Capital accumulation
then makes final goods producers less dependent on the resource and thereby lowers the market power
the monopolist can exert in the second period.
29
K1 < K2 and RC∗1 > RC∗2 in the competition case, then both, the capital accumulation
and the falling resource extraction, contribute to an unambiguous decrease (rise) in
Rt,pt
14 over time for σ < 1 (for σ > 1). This implies that the naive monopolist
will choose a more (less) conservationist extraction path compared to the competitive
market for σ < 1 (for σ > 1).15 If either K1 < K2 while RC∗1 < RC∗2 or K1 > K2
while RC∗1 > RC∗2 , then the effects of capital dynamics and supply pattern on the price
elasticity of demand Rt,pt are counteracting each other. This implies that the incentive
for the monopolist to deviate from the competitive outcome is ambiguous.16
For σ = 1 and Cobb-Douglas technology the price elasticity of demand is not affected by
changes in the capital stock and naive monopolistic and competitive extraction coincide
with and without capital dynamics.
3.2.3 General Equilibrium Feedback and Existence of Equilibrium
The role of capital accumulation was so far discussed with exogenous changes in the
capital stock. In our model framework, however, the second period capital stock K2 and
the future interest rate i2 are endogenous and lead to additional general equilibrium
feedback effects while the monopolist deviates from the competitive extraction path.
The interest rate even changes in the case with exogenously and constant capital stocks
when switching from the competitive market to the naive monopoly in section 3.2.1.
These feedback effects from the endogeneity of the capital market equilibrium have
an impact on the naive monopolist’s extraction path in equilibrium, even though the
naive monopolist is not aware of them. For example, when the naive monopolist shifts
resources to the future compared to the competitive outcome and thereby reproduces
the conservationist bias the postponement of extraction goes along with an increase in
i2 according to (38) and a decrease in K2 as (41) is assumed to hold throughout.
These feedback effects imply that in contrast to a partial equilibrium analysis, the left
side of the Hotelling condition (45) effectively reacts to a shift of resources extraction
from the first to the second period according to
d(1 + i2)MRN1
dR2
= d(1 + i2)MR
N
1
dR1
dR1
dR2
= MRN1
di2
dR2
− ∂MR
N
1
∂R1
∣∣∣∣∣
K1
> 0 (56)
14A decrease in the negative  means a rise in its absolute value.
15Nevertheless, we generally cannot conclude that the conservationist bias is stronger or weaker than
in the partial equilibrium setting.
16Note that a scenario K1 > K2 and RC∗1 < RC∗2 is logically inconsistent.
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The effective total reaction of the right side of Hotelling condition (45) is given by
dMRN2
dR2
= ∂MR
N
2
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
K2
+ ∂MR
N
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
dK2
dR2
= 2− σ
σ
(
θ2R − 1− σ2− σ
)
dp2
dR2
< 0 (57)
which is unambiguously negative at least for MRN2 ≥ 0 according to (47), (48) and
dK2
dR2
< 0.17
Since MRN1 di2dR2 ≥ 0 and
∂MRN2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣
R2
dK2
dR2
< 0, these feedback effects strengthen the par-
tial equilibrium reaction of the marginal revenue in each period and thus dampen the
reallocation of resources by the naive monopolist when starting from the competitive
market equilibrium relative to a partial equilibrium analysis.
To prove the existence of an equilibrium solution, we consider the limits of the left
and the right side of the Hotelling condition (45) for R2 → 0 (R1 → R¯) and R2 → R¯
(R1 → 0). We show in appendix B.4.2 that
lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRN1 > lim
R2→R¯
MRN2
whereas
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRN1 < lim
R2→0
MRN2
This implies that there necessarily exists an inner equilibrium solution defined by the
Hotelling condition (45) and given that the conditional market equilibrium holds. More-
over, since both sides of the Hotelling condition are falling in the respective resource
supply, this equilibrium outcome is unique and stable.
3.3 Scenario NA: A ’Naive’ Monopolist with a Capital Asset
Motive
For the second scenario, we enlarge the monopolist’s scope of information of the more
widespread effects of resource supply. The monopolist is aware of the final goods’
production technology in country I or, more specifically, of the complementarity of fossil
resources and capital in production (see (3)). However, the monopolist still evaluates
feasible resource supply paths based on partial equilibrium considerations and therefore
17Note that MRNt ≥ 0 implies θtR ≥ 12−σ .
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is still considered “naive” with respect to the general equilibrium feedback effects from
the endogeneity of the capital market equilibrium overall.
Without all the general equilibrium related terms in (43), the equilibrium and the
corresponding optimal resource extraction path then is characterized by the modified
Hotelling condition (
1 + iNA∗2
)
MRNA∗1 = MRNA∗2 (58)
where we define the modified marginal revenue
MRNAt = MRNAt (Kt, Rt) = MRNt + FtKR(Kt, Rt)s(t−1)E(y1E, pi2E, i2) (59)
as the marginal value of the resource from the monopolist’s perspective. We denote
the optimal extraction policy by (RNA∗1 , RNA∗2 ) and, correspondingly, the equilibrium
outcomes of all the endogenous variables by the superscript “xNA∗”.
From the benevolent sheikh’s perspective, there is now a positive and simultaneous in-
fluence of resource supply on the capital return on households’ savings running via the
complementarity of resources and capital in final goods’ production.18 This introduces
an “asset motive” to the optimal resource supply decision, additional to the standard
monopolistic strategic motive. The asset motive adds to the standard resource market
revenue MRNt from (46) whenever country E’s households have positive foreign capital
holdings s(t−1)E > 0, i.e. no debt positions (cf. Calvo and Findlay (1978)). It is inter-
esting that there may be situations where the naive monopolist considers the resource
only as scarce if he accounts for the asset motive (i.e. MRNAt > 0 while MRNt < 0).
With a finite time horizon, the scarcity of the resource from the monopolistic supplier’s
perspective therefore not only depends on the resource stock available but also on the
level of information that the supplier has.
An intuitive interpretation of the scenario at hand is again the notion of a benevolent
sheikh. For a monopolistic profit maximizing oil firm there obviously would not be any
reason to consider the returns on the households’ capital savings. Moreover, due to
the asset motive pure resource profit maximization does no longer lead to households’
income or utility maximization. With households endogenously and optimally choosing
18Since the sheikh still takes capital stocks as given, but is aware of the complementarity of resources
and capital in final goods production, the resource price pt and the capital price it are just functions
of resource supply from his perspective with
∂pt
∂Rt
= FtRR(Kt, Rt) and
∂it
∂Rt
= FtKR(Kt, Rt)
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savings, utility maximization by planning resource extraction is, in the end, equivalent
to maximizing households’ life-time income. However, as soon as the sheikh accounts for
the asset motive, maximizing just resource income by choice of the resource extraction
path generally cannot be optimal in contrast to scenario N .
3.3.1 Effects of the Asset Motive
We now consider the effect of the asset motive on the optimal extraction choice of the
benevolent sheikh. For a single period, the asset motive always raises the marginal value
of the resource from the monopolist’s perspective and thereby in principle creates an
incentive to increase resource supply ceteris paribus whenever there are positive capital
holdings s(t−1)E > 0. Along the lines of section 3.2, we can rearrange the extended
marginal revenue of resource supply to19
MRNAt =
pt
σ
[
θtR + θtK
s(t−1)E
Kt
− (1− σ)
]
(60)
where θtf = Ff (t)ftFt again denotes factor f ’s income share in total final goods output
of period t. Thus, the weight of the asset motive relative to the standard monopoly
considerations from scenario N in one period is determined by the share of total pro-
duction (or income) that the monopolist’s country E receives as capital income from
abroad θtK
s(t−1)E
Kt
. The latter notably does not depend on the amount (value in terms
of final goods) of capital assets held by country E but on the share of these assets in
total capital stock.
However, for positive capital endowment and savings, there is an asset motive in both
periods. Since we generally cannot solve for the optimal extraction path explicitly,
we assess the effect of pursuing the asset motive on the extraction path by use of a
thought experiment. We assume that the sheikh extracts according to the standard
monopoly Hotelling rule (45) but then, for whatever reason, becomes aware of the
(partial) complementarity of fossil resources and capital. The sheikh will update his
decision rule for resource supply to (58) and assess the initially optimal extraction path
(RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) based on this updated optimality condition. In the following, we aim to
characterize the direction of the adjustment in resource extraction that will be necessary
to fulfill the new equilibrium condition (58).
As a benchmark, we derive the case when the asset motive is neutral relative to the
19A similar transformation can be found in Calvo and Findlay (1978).
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standard monopoly outcome so that it does not induce any change in resource sup-
ply. Correspondingly, taking extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) from the naive monopolist’s
equilibrium as reference supply policy, neutrality of the asset motive implies that
MRNA2 (KN∗2 , RN∗2 )
MRNA1 (K1, RN∗1 )
= 1 + iN∗2 =
MRN2 (KN∗2 , RN∗2 )
MRN1 (K1, RN∗1 )
holds when we combine the equilibrium resource supply conditions (45) and (58). Re-
arranging and using ∂i2
∂R2
= F2KR, yields
F2KR(KN∗2 , RN∗2 ) · s1E(yN∗1E , piN∗2E , iN∗2 )
F1KR(K1, RN∗1 ) · s0E
= MR
N∗
2
MRN∗1
= 1 + iN∗2 (61)
Thus, the asset motive is exactly neutral if the returns for conserving one resource unit
underground are the same in terms of capital income and resource income.20
We summarize our results on the effect of the asset motive in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The effect of the asset motive on the monopolist’s extraction decision
in comparison to the equilibrium outcome of scenario N (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) depends on country
E’s asset accumulation. The asset motive is exactly neutral if
sN∗1E
s0E
=
MRN∗2
F2KR(KN∗2 ,RN∗2 )
MRN∗1
F1KR(K1,RN∗1 )
≡ Φ(RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) (62)
If s1E
s0E
< Φ, the asset motive leads to a shift of resources to the first period. In contrast,
for s1E
s0E
> Φ or s0E = 0 and s1E > 0 the asset motive induces a postponement of
extraction.
Taking the extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) as reference effectively fixes all the endogenous
variables from the conditional market equilibrium but country E’s capital savings s1E.
20 In this case the difference in the second and the first period share of total production which is
captured by country E and taken into account by the sheikh when choosing resource supply is the
same as when the sheikh does not pursue the asset motive and just considers resource income as in
scenario N , i.e. we have
θN∗2R + θN∗2K
s1E
KN∗2
−
(
θN∗1R + θN∗1K
s0E
K1
)
= θN∗2R − θN∗1R
When shifting resources to period t, the sheikh knows that he can capture from the marginal production
increase FtR the share θtR + θtK
s(t−1)E
Kt
if he pursues the asset motive. In contrast, from the purely
naive monopolist’s perspective this share is reduced to θtR.
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Since the aggregated capital stock K2 is a function of the resource supply path only.21
the reference equilibrium from scenario N does not depend on the distribution of capital
endowment between both countries. In contrast, the savings decision of households in
country E is a function of the overall first period household income y1E according to
(23).22 Therefore, not onlyMRNA1 but also capital holdings of households in the second
period s1E directly depend on the (exogenous) distribution of the given capital stock
K1 between both countries. To isolate the role of capital endowment s0E, we solve
neutrality condition (61) for the ratio of asset holdings which gives the threshold Φ in
(62). The threshold Φ may be lower or greater than unity, in general.23 For σ = 1, the
factor shares θtf for f = Kt, Rt are constant over time24 so that Φ = K
N∗
2
K1
.25
If s1E
s0E
> Φ, we can refer to (61) and conclude that conserving a marginal resource unit
for future supply yields a higher return from capital income than from resource income
due to the increase in capital holdings. This implies that the sheikh is confronted with
the inequality
MRNA2 (KN∗2 , RN∗2 ) > (1 + iN∗2 )MRNA1 (K1, RN∗1 )
when he suddenly becomes aware of the asset motive and evaluates the modified
Hotelling rule with assets (58) for the extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) which is optimal
according to (49). For s1E
s0E
< Φ, the contrary holds true.
In either case, the sheikh has an incentive to adjust his extraction path and will shift
resources to the period where the marginal resource value from his perspective is higher.
For s1E
s0E
> Φ, the asset motive leads to a postponement of extraction compared to the
standard monopoly equilibrium of scenario N . This is also the case for s0E = 0 when
the asset motive only adds to the second period marginal resource value.26 In contrast,
for s1E
s0E
< Φ, the asset motive induces the sheikh to accelerate extraction compared
to the standard monopoly equilibrium, because the positive effect of resource supply
21Recall that this is due to our assumption of symmetric homothetic preferences in both countries
and the exogeneity of the aggregated capital endowment K1.
22Recall that y1E = pi1E + (1 + i1)s0E by (21).
23Recall that θtR > 1− σ for MRNt > 0.
24For σ = 1 or α = 0, the CES-technology in (1) is equivalent to a Cobb-Douglas production
function Ft = Kγt Rλt L1−γ−λ so that the income share of the respective production factor is given by
the respective constant exponent.
25By use of (46), we may rewrite Φ = K
N∗
2
K1
θN∗2R −(1−σ)
θN∗1R −(1−σ)
θN∗2K
θN∗1K
.
26Note that the elasticity of substitution determines whether and how neutrality condition (62) is
violated for a given capital endowment s0E as it influences the right side and via the savings decision
also the left side. We discuss the role of the elasticity of substitution in more detail in section 5.
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on capital income in the first period dominates the capital income effect in the second
period.
The impact of a redistribution of capital endowments is summarized in proposition 4.
Proposition 4. A redistribution of capital endowments towards country E always leads
to an acceleration of extraction.
A redistribution of capital endowments between both countries does not influence the
threshold Φ because the equilibrium outcome in scenario N does not depend on the
distribution of capital endowments. From (16), the marginal savings propensities then
are insensitive to changes in the capital endowment distribution, too. We show in
appendix B.1.1 that savings s1E therefore are ceteris paribus linearly increasing in
capital endowment s0E when capital endowments are redistributed to country E whereas
we have27
∂ s1E
s0E
∂s0E
∣∣∣∣∣
K1,RN∗1 ,R
N∗
2
= 1
s0E
[
∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )−
s1E
s0E
]
= −s1E(0)
s20E
< 0 (63)
so that the ratio of asset holding will fall with any redistribution of capital endowment
to country E. This implies that the monopolist’s incentive to postpone extraction is
more and more reduced and is even reversed if the ratio of second to first period capital
holdings falls below Φ. By increasing first period capital holdings, the redistribution
of endowments disproportionally strengthens the capital income component in the first
period over the one of the second period and thereby lowers the return via capital
income which the sheikh can get from conserving resources underground.
The capital endowment redistribution to country E is, however, limited by the given
first period capital stock K1 so that there is a lower bound on the ratio of asset hold-
ings. Therefore, the neutrality condition (62) cannot be met even for any s0E > 0 (cf.
appendix B.1.1) if
Φ ≤ ∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 ) = lims0E→∞
s1E
s0E
∣∣∣∣
K1,RN∗1 ,R
N∗
2
where ∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 ) measures the marginal increase in savings from a marginal increase
in capital endowment upon redistribution. In this case, we always have s1E
s0E
> Φ and a
postponement of extraction compared to the outcome of scenario N for all s0E > 0.
27s1E(0) denotes savings for the case of no capital endowment s0E = 0.
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3.3.2 Asset Motive and Competitive Resource Extraction
We showed that the asset motive may induce the monopolist both to speed up or to
slow down extraction depending on the capital endowment s0E. In general, the asset
motive, therefore, may strengthen, dampen or even reverse the conservationist bias
in the extraction pattern which is introduced by market power in comparison with a
competitive resource sector for σ < 1 (see section 3.2.1).
To analyze the extraction decision of the naive monopolist pursuing the asset motive
in comparison with the competitive outcome we again rely on a comparative static
analysis. We assume that the optimal competitive extraction path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) falls
over time even though we have capital accumulation and evaluate Hotelling condition
(58) for the optimal competitive extraction. The asset motive will exactly overturn the
conservationist bias of the naive monopolist without asset motive in scenario N if
(1 + iC∗2 )MRNA1 (K1, RC∗1 ) = MRNA2 (KC∗2 , RC∗2 ) (64)
The following proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5. The asset motive counterbalances the conservationist bias from (naive)
monopoly power for σ < 1 and a decreasing competitive supply path if
∆ ≡ θ2R + θ2K s1E
K2
−
(
θ1R + θ1K
s0E
K1
)
= 0 for (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ). (65)
If ∆ < 0, the asset motive reverses the conservationist bias whereas for ∆ > 0, the
naive monopolist with asset motive still extracts more conservationist than the compet-
itive market. For iso-elastic demand, the equivalency of competitive and monopolistic
extraction may fall apart. A reversal of the conservationist bias is more likely with
higher asset endowments in country E.
Since along the optimal competitive extraction path the Hotelling rule (50) holds, we
can rearrange and simplify the equality condition (64) using (60) to get (65). The
parameter ∆ indicates whether the share of final goods’ production which the sheik
consciously can capture as factor remuneration for his constituency increases or falls
over time for the competitive equilibrium extraction path.28
28 The reasoning is, therefore, similar to the previous assessment of the effect of the asset motive
in comparison with the purely naive monopolist from scenario N . However, whereas the latter only
accounts for resource income and thereby considers the development of the resource income share
over time when choosing the extraction path, a competitive resource supplier does not account for his
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The monopolist will shift resources to the period where the share of the marginal
increase in total output which he captures as factor income is greater. Therefore,
if ∆ < 0 for (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ), the monopolist has an incentive to shift resources to the
first period and thereby to reverse the conservationist bias. In contrast, if ∆ > 0,
the monopolist will choose a more conservationist extraction policy relative to the
competitive extraction path. In this case, the conservationist bias may be dampened
or strengthened, in general.29
Even though iso-elastic resource demand for σ = 1 implies constant resource and capital
factor shares θtR and θtK (see above), resource market power no longer needs to be
neutral compared to the competitive outcome when the monopolist pursues the asset
motive. The reason is that at least the share of country E’s assets in the capital stock is
very likely to change over time. Moreover, since the naive monopoly outcome coincides
with the competitive case for σ = 1, the effect of the asset motive on the supply choice
of the monopolist can equivalently be identified from ∆ from (65) and the threshold Φ
from (62).
With a redistribution of endowment to country E, ∆ falls as the ratio of asset holdings
s1E
s0E
decreases (cf. (88)) whereas competitive extraction and thereby the factor shares
θtR, θtK do not change due to the assumption of symmetric homothetic consumption
preferences. Thus, the asset motive therefore is more likely to reverse the conservationist
bias the higher the asset endowment of country E. This is also in line with our previous
conclusion that an increase in asset endowment s0E generally creates an incentive to
speed up extraction relative to the standard monopoly case.
3.3.3 General Equilibrium Feedbacks and Existence of Equilibrium
As in section (3.2), even though the naive monopolist with asset motive is not aware of
the general equilibrium feedback effects from the endogenous adjustment of the overall
influence on aggregated supply, production and market prices at all.
Moreover, note that the conservationist bias for σ < 1 and a falling competitive extraction path
(RC∗1 > RC∗2 ) (see section 3.2) arises because we then have θ1R < θ2R. Similarly, the monopolist
speeds up extraction for σ > 1 when θ1R > θ2R, and does not deviate from the competitive extraction
path for σ = 1 which implies θ1R = θ2R.
Therefore, with and without asset motive, the extraction decision of the monopolist in comparison
to the competitive market is directly linked to the development of the share of total production which
the monopolist can capture for “his” households and which the monopolist, depending on his level of
information, is consciously influencing by his extraction decision.
29Note that for ∆ < 0 we must have θ1K s0EK1 > θ2K
s1E
K2
as the conservationist bias in the standard
naive monopoly case follows from |R1,p1 | < |R2,p2 | which implies θ1R < θ2R by (51). In contrast, for
∆ > 0 the capital income share of country E may rise or fall over time.
38
capital market equilibrium, these feedback effects influence the overall equilibrium out-
come. Moreover, with the asset motive both sides of the modified Hotelling condition
(58) may no longer fall monotonously in the resource supply of the respective period.
We show in appendix B.1.2 that the left side in (58) unambiguously decreases in R1
taking into account the resource constraint (17) and therefore unambiguously increases
in R2,30 i.e. we have
d(1 + i2)MRNA1
dR2
= −(1 + i2) ∂MR
NA
1
∂R1
∣∣∣∣∣
s0E ,K1
+MRNA1
di2
dR2
> 0 (66)
at least as long as MRNA1 ≥ 0. The first term measures the partial (ceteris paribus)
change in the modified marginal revenue from a marginal shift of resource supply from
the first to the second period. The second term captures the feedback effect in general
equilibrium via the induced change in the market discount rate i2 and is positive ac-
cording to di2
dR2
> 0 from (38). As already pointed out before, this endogenous reaction
of the interest rate in the general equilibrium setting generally attenuates any incentive
to reallocate resource extraction compared to a partial equilibrium analysis but cannot
reverse the incentive to accelerate or postpone extraction itself.
For the left side of (58), the discussion in appendix B.1.2 demonstrates that
dMRNA2
dR2
= ∂MR
NA
2
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
s1E ,K2
+ ∂MR
NA
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
s1E ,R2
dK2
dR2
+ ∂MR
NA
2
∂s1E
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,K2
ds1E
dR2
(67)
is generally of ambiguous sign. The ambiguity arises due to the second and third terms
which capture the feedback effects from the endogeneity of overall capital accumulation
and of the households’ asset holdings in general equilibrium and their influence on
MRNA2 . The second term measures the effect of the induced decrease in the second
period capital stock (dK2
dR2
< 0 from (41)) on the modified marginal revenue MRNA2
which generally may be positive or negative. The third term in (67) represents the
feedback from the induced change in asset holdings in the second period where we have
∂MRNA2
∂s1E
∣∣∣∣
R2,K2
= F2KR > 0. Since a change in the extraction path leads to changes in the
interest rate and the period incomes, the savings reaction of households in country E is
generally of ambiguous sign due to counteracting substitution and income effects (see
also appendix A.2.3) although overall capital accumulation falls with any postponement
30Note again that the resource monopolist always chooses the extraction path such that MRNAt > 0
in both periods. Otherwise, the resource would not be scarce so that the resource constraint no longer
binds and the functional relationships in the conditional market equilibrium derived in section 2.4 no
longer hold.
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of extraction.
In contrast to MRN2 , which monotonously falls in R2 according to (67), we therefore
cannot exclude that MRNA2 may increase in R2 due to the influence of the endogeneity
of capital accumulation and savings on the second period asset motive. In appendix
B.1.2, we show that MRNA2 may increase only for rather high R2 on the one hand
and is ceteris paribus more likely to increase in R2 if country E owns higher capital
endowment s0E on the other.
The potential upward slope of MRNA2 may in principle be problematic for proving the
existence of an equilibrium outcome defined by Hotelling condition (58) by following
the reasoning of section 3.2.3 and considering the limits of the left and the right side of
the Hotelling condition for R2 → 0 and R2 → R¯. However, we show in appendix B.4.3
that still
lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRNA1 > lim
R2→R¯
MRNA2
whereas
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRNA1 < lim
R2→0
MRNA2
so that there again must exist at least one interior solution for which Hotelling condition
(58) holds in the conditional market equilibrium. In contrast to scenario N , ifMRNA2 is
indeed upward sloping for some R2, the equilibrium in scenario NAmay not be uniquely
defined but there may be multiple (interior) solutions. Still, our previous conclusions
about the effect of the asset motive on the extraction decision of the monopolist hold
as long as we consider only stable equilibrium outcomes. As generally pointed out in
section 3.1, stability requires that
d(1 + i2)MRNA1
dR2
>
dMRNA2
dR2
for (RNA∗1 , RNA∗2 )
which implies that if the monopolist is confronted with any inequality in the Hotelling
condition, he is induced to restore the equilibrium outcome by comparing the marginal
resource value in both periods (in terms of period 2 values).
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3.4 Scenario G: General Equilibrium Information without As-
set Motive
We now assume that the monopolist realizes the endogeneity of second period resource
demand p2(K2, R2) in general equilibrium, but does not consider his influence on the
return on capital. The monopolist therefore accounts for the total price reaction dp2
dR2
from (37), which notably also includes the feedback from capital accumulation. At the
same time, however, he does not recognize (or does not care for31) any influence on
the interest rate, neither from the complementarity effect of resource supply (FtKR) nor
from the induced change in capital accumulation (F2KK dK2dR2 ).
By suppressing the asset related terms in (43), optimal extraction and the overall equi-
librium in this third scenario G is therefore defined by condition
(1 + iG∗2 )MRG∗1 = MRG∗2 (68)
where the marginal resource value from the sheikh’s perspective is given by
MRG2 = MRG2 (K2, R2) = p2 +
dp2
dR2
R2 = MRN2 +
∂p2
∂K2
R2
dK2
dR2
(69)
The optimal extraction path, which is again implicitly defined by (68), is denoted by
(RG∗1 , RG∗2 ) and correspondingly the equilibrium outcome of the endogenous variables
by the superscript “xG∗”. We may interpret scenario G as the general equilibrium
counterpart to scenario N of a naive monopolist in section 3.2. With the scenario at
hand we introduce a distinction between cases with and without an asset motive in
general equilibrium, which is in line with the distinction of scenarios N and NA for the
naive monopolist.
3.4.1 Addiction Motive
To analyze the influence of the general equilibrium feedback effects we compare con-
dition (68) with (49), the respective Hotelling rule from scenario N . Since the first
period’s marginal revenues formally coincide without pursuing any asset motive and
with given capital endowments K1, we can first restrict the analysis to the second pe-
riod. In particular, we do not need to derive an intertemporal neutrality condition as
31Maybe the intuitive interpretation as an oil ministry as more appropriate than a comprehensively
benevolent sheikh in this scenario.
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in scenario NA in section 3.3.
For the comparison of the optimal extraction paths, that are implicitly defined by (68)
and (49), we again assume that the sheikh initially supplies the resource according
to (49), but then notices the dependency of second period demand on his extraction
policy via capital accumulation, so that he updates his supply policy to (68). Propo-
sition 6 summarizes the results on the comparison with the naive monopolist’s outcome.
Proposition 6. Letting the monopolist become aware of the endogeneity of second-
period resource demand, the so-called addiction motive of resource supply arises in gen-
eral equilibrium if capital and resources are complementary in production and dK2
dR2
< 0.
The addiction motive always induces the monopolist to speed up extraction compared
the naive monopolist’s equilibrium solution from scenario N . The strength of the addic-
tion motive depends on the relationship between first period resource supply and second
period resource demand but not on the distribution of capital endowments.
From (37) we know that
dp2
dR2
<
∂p2
∂R2
< 0
for dK2
dR2
< 0, and correspondingly
MRG2 = p2 +
∂p2
∂R2
+ ∂p2
∂K2
dK2
dR2
< MRN2 = p2 +
∂p2
∂R2
for any extraction path (R1, R2). This implies on the one hand that there is no point of
intersection betweenMRG2 andMRN2 (for the same extraction path) as long as dK2dR2 6= 0.
Moreover, as before, the Hotelling rule (68) only constitutes an equilibrium condition
if MRN1 ,MRG2 > 0 for extraction path (RG∗1 , RG∗2 ) and complete exhaustion of the
resource stock R¯. Changing the monopolist’s level of knowledge from scenario N to
scenario G thus could turn a scarce resource into an abundant one for some extraction
paths from his perspective. Assuming, as we do, that the resource constraint indeed
binds, we can also conclude from these observations that for the optimal extraction
path in scenario G (RG∗1 , RG∗2 ) the marginal revenue in scenario N MRN2 (RG∗1 , RG∗2 )
from (46) has to be strictly positive, too.
For extraction policy (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ), which is initially optimal in our thought experiment,
we therefore always have MRG2 < MRN2 . The first period marginal revenues and the
interest rate i2 completely coincide for the given extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ). Thus,
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the sheikh will unambiguously speed up extraction as soon as he becomes aware of his
negative influence on capital accumulation, future resource demand and the value of
future extraction.
By shifting resources from the second to the first period, the monopolist aims to boost
capital accumulation and to increase – given the complementarity of capital and re-
sources in production – the dependency of the importing economy on the input factor
“oil” or, equivalently, future resource demand. The monopolist therefore may be seen
as an “oil-drug” dealer who is not only exploiting but even manipulating country I’s
addiction to fossil resources. We refer to this strategic component of resource supply in
general equilibrium as “addiction motive” which inherently arises from the introduced
general equilibrium framework for dK2
dR2
< 0 as soon as we let the monopolist become
aware of the endogeneity of second period resource demand.
The effect of the addiction motive may also be described with the aid of a total gen-
eral equilibrium price elasticity of demand, which incorporates the general equilibrium
feedback effects (cf. appendix B.2.1). The according reformulation of the Hotelling
condition shows that the higher the sensitivity of the capital stock dK2
dR2
K2
R2
, the less
price elastic will be second period demand and the less attractive will be second pe-
riod resource supply from the monopolist’s perspective. Moreover, with symmetric
homothetic preferences the relationship between aggregated capital accumulation and
the extraction path does not depend on the distribution of asset endowments between
both countries. In contrast to the asset motive, any redistribution of endowments is
completely neutral with respect to the addiction motive.
As in general equilibrium the interest rate reacts with shifting resources according to
(38) and depending on the elasticity of substitution between resource and capital, the
addiction motive is dampened and the difference between the equilibrium extraction
paths defined by (68) and by (45) is reduced. The acceleration of extraction cannot be
reversed though.
3.4.2 Addiction Motive and Competitive Extraction
Proposition 6 does not depend on the elasticity of substitution being lower or greater
than unity. Extraction is always accelerated relative to the naive monopoly in scenario
N . The occurrence of the addiction motive thus modifies the comparison monopoly vs.
competition in section 3.2.1 as summarized by the following proposition.
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Proposition 7. The addiction motive induces the monopolist to additionally accelerate
extraction. For σ > 1, the monopolist accelerates extraction even further compared to
the competitive outcome than the naive monopolist. He also speeds up extraction for
σ = 1 (iso-elastic demand) so that the equivalency of monopolistic and competitive
extraction no longer holds. For σ < 1 and a sufficiently high dK2
dR2
, the addiction motive
may even reverse the conservationist bias of the standard naive monopoly case.
The condition for a reversal of the conservationist bias is explained in the appendix (cf.
B.2.3).
3.4.3 General Equilibrium Feedbacks and Existence of Equilibrium
Due to the general equilibrium feedback effects, the total reaction of the future marginal
revenue MRG2 to changes in R2 is of ambiguous sign. All additive terms in
dMRG2
dR2
are
negative (cf. appendix B.2.2) apart from F2KRR2 d
2K2
(dR2)2 , which can be positive, at least
according to our numerical example in figure 4 (cf. appendix). Therefore, we can not
exclude one or more areas with a positive slope and the incidence of multiple (interior)
equilibria, although we did not observe any in our numerical examples. In the appendix
(B.4.4) we show that at least one interior equilibrium exists, that it must be a stable
one according to the stability criterion in section 3.1 and that multiple equilibria (in
case they exist) must also be interior solutions. Even if multiple equilibria occured,
MRG2 < MR
N
2 holds and the conclusion that the addiction motive always leads to an
acceleration of extraction remains unaffected.
3.5 Scenario GA: General Equilibrium Information with Asset
Motive
Finally, if we let the sheikh be aware of the endogeneity of the second period capital
stock as well as of the dependency of the capital income on resource supply, we return
to equilibrium condition (43) and consider a truly omniscient and benevolent resource
monopolist. In general equilibrium, a full level of awareness of the economic structure
naturally leads the benevolent monopolist to pursue both strategic motives at the same
time, the asset motive and the addiction motive. In the following, we first will show
that the asset motive is modified by the general equilibrium feedback effect from the
capital market. Moreover, we will discuss the interaction between both strategic motives
which characterizes the supply policy in this final scenario by comparison with the naive
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standard monopoly case and with the competitive extraction path.
3.5.1 The Asset Motive in General Equilibrium and the Interrelationship
Between the Resource and the Capital Market
We start by considering the modified marginal revenues MRGAt in (43) in more detail.
The left side of (43) is identical to the left side in (58) so that we have
(1 + i2)MRGA1 = (1 + i2)MRNA1 for any extraction path (R1, R2).
Expanding the monopolist’s awareness does not change his marginal revenue in the first
period in comparison to scenario NA, since the present capital stock K1 is fixed and
does not cause any general equilibrium feedback effects.
Since the omniscient monopolist explicitly recognizes the endogeneity of the second
period capital stock, the marginal revenues in the second period of scenarios NA and
GA are not identical, i.e. the right side of (43) significantly differs from the right side
in (58) as decomposing MRGA2 by use of (37) and (38) demonstrates
MRGA2 = p2 +
(
∂p2
∂R2
+ ∂p2
∂K2
dK2
dR2
)
R2 +
(
∂i2
∂R2
+ ∂i2
∂K2
dK2
dR2
)
s1E (70)
Proposition 8. Letting the naive monopolist with a partial or naive asset motive be-
come aware of the overall economic structure strengthens the asset motive in period 2
by adding a feedback effect from capital accumulation, which unambiguously contributes
to an extraction shift to the future.
With full general equilibrium knowledge, the monopolist pursuing the asset motive not
only considers the positive influence of resource supply on capital returns from the
complementarity of fossil resources and capital but also the effect of changes in capital
accumulation that are induced by any shift in the extraction path. The asset motive
in the “true” marginal revenue in period 2 (from the omniscient monopolist’s point of
view), therefore, encompasses an additional component relative to scenario NA which
supports the complementarity effect on the capital return
di2
dR2
s1E =
∂i2
∂R2
s1E +
∂i2
∂K2
dK2
dR2
s1E
according to (38). This feedback effect from capital accumulation is positive because
we have a strictly concave production technology (F2KK < 0) and assume ση > 1 and
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therefore dK2
dR2
< 0 (see (41)) throughout the analysis. Shifting resources to the second
period, on the one hand, increases future capital returns since additional resources foster
the productivity of the given capital stock. On the other hand, the future capital stock
will be lower, which also raises the marginal productivity of capital, i.e. (in equilibrium)
the interest rate i2. Thus, the second period asset motive is generally strengthened
by the additional term ∂i2
∂K2
dK2
dR2
s1E for given savings and capital endowment which in
principle establishes an incentive for the omniscient monopolist to slow down extraction
relative to scenario NA.
The decomposition of MRGA2 in (70), however, also demonstrates that becoming aware
of the overall economic structure and the interrelation between capital and resource
market also introduces the addiction motive of scenario G. In total, therefore, two
additional but counteracting considerations influence the monopolist’s supply strat-
egy. The addiction motive creates an unambiguous incentive to speed up extraction.
Thereby, it obviously counteracts the strengthening of the second period’s asset motive.
The overall implication of being aware of the interrelation between the capital and re-
source markets for the monopolist’s supply decision therefore depends on the weighting
of these counteracting effects and motives. To this end, we may define
Ψ ≡ ∂p2
∂K2
R2 +
∂i2
∂K2
s1E (71)
which is a nonlinear function of R2 and generally of ambiguous sign, discussed in more
detail in appendix B.3.1. Wherever Ψ > 0, we have ∂p2
∂K2
R2 > − ∂i2∂K2 s1E and the addiction
motive dominates the strengthening of the second period’s asset motive. In this case,
internalizing the feedback effect from capital accumulation creates an incentive for the
omniscient monopolist to accelerate extraction at the given extraction path for which
we evaluate Ψ. In contrast, for Ψ < 0, the strengthening of second period’s asset motive
outweighs the addiction motive so that the feedback effect from capital accumulation
overall works towards a more conservationist extraction policy relative to the given
extraction path. By (44) and (59), Ψ also indicates whether the marginal resource
value from the omniscient monopolist’s perspective exceeds the marginal revenue from
the perspective of the naive monopolist with asset motive or not.
3.5.2 Scenario GA vs. Scenario G
The general equilibrium counterpart to our analysis of the asset motive in section 3.3 is
a comparison between the omniscient monopolist’s outcome and scenario G from sec-
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tion 3.4. Proceeding along the lines of section 3.3 we characterize the effect of the full
general equilibrium asset motive on the extraction path relative to a monopolist who
already pursues the addiction motive only. We summarize our results by the following
proposition.
Proposition 9. Taking the addiction scenario G as reference, the asset motive may
induce the omniscient monopolist to both postpone or speed up extraction in general
equilibrium. It is exactly neutral if
s1E
s0E
= MR
G∗
2
MRG∗1
∂i1
∂R1
di2
dR2
≡ Φˆ (72)
The monopolist accelerates extraction for s1E
s0E
< Φˆ but slows down extraction for s1E
s0E
>
Φˆ (for dK2
dR2
< 0). A redistribution of capital endowments to country E makes the
monopolist shift the resource extraction to the present.
The overall asset motive in general equilibrium (i.e. including the partial complemen-
tarity effect FtKR as well as the general equilibrium feedback via capital accumulation
for the second period F2KK dK2dR2 ) will be neutral compared to the pure addiction scenario
G so that it does not induce any change in the optimal extraction path if
MRGA∗2
MRGA∗1
= MR
G∗
2
MRG∗1
= 1 + iG∗2
holds for extraction path (RG∗1 , RG∗2 ) that is implicitly defined by (68). Following the
reasoning from section 3.3.1, we isolate the effect of capital endowment s0E by solving
for the ratio of asset holdings which yields the modified neutrality threshold in (72).
For extraction path (RG∗1 , RG∗2 ) we may additionally substitute for
MRG∗2
MRG∗1
from (68). The
modified threshold Φˆ thus is the general equilibrium counterpart of threshold Φ from
(62). Since MRG1 = MRN1 and MRG2 < MRN2 according to (46), (69) and (37) as well
as F2KR < di2dR2 according to (38), we have Φ > Φˆ for any extraction path.
32 Note,
however, that we evaluate the neutrality conditions (62) and (72) for different reference
extraction paths.
The interpretation of the modified neutrality condition (72) is completely analog to our
previous discussion of threshold Φ in section 3.3.1. If s1E
s0E
< Φˆ, conserving resources
32From the definition of Φˆ and Φ in (62) also follows that Φˆ = ΦF2KRdi2
dR2
MRG2
MRN2
which shows that Φˆ < Φ
as F2KRdi2
dR2
< 1 and MR
G
2
MRN2
< 1.
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underground yields a lower return in terms of capital income from the now omniscient
monopolist’s perspective than in terms of pure resource market income. Therefore,
the monopolist will speed up extraction even further (compared to the already non-
conservationist extraction path of the addiction scenario) as soon as he updates his
extraction strategy from (68) to (43). As the general equilibrium component of the
asset motive contributes to a postponement of extraction, this incentive to speed up
extraction even more than in the addiction case G for s1E
s0E
< Φˆ must be established by
the naive or partial equilibrium component of the asset motive.33
For s1E
s0E
> Φˆ, the second period asset motive overall gives the monopolist an incen-
tive to conserve more resources for future supply compared to the reference extraction
path (RG∗1 , RG∗2 ). However, in this case, we cannot attribute the incentive to slow down
extraction to a specific component of the second period’s asset motive because the com-
plementarity component of the asset motives may or may not establish an incentive to
speed up extraction at the same time. This also demonstrates that we generally cannot
conclude from the threshold condition (72) on the sign of the weighting parameter Ψ
from (71).
Since the addiction motive and the according extraction decision in scenario G are
completely independent of the distribution of capital endowments (symmetric homoth-
etic preferences), taking extraction path (RG∗1 , RG∗2 ) as reference, therefore, fixes all the
endogenous variables which are functions of the extraction path. The only exception
is that for the omniscient monopolist savings s1E depend on the initial distribution of
capital endowments between both countries, as in section 3.3.1. Thus, Φˆ, just as Φ,
is independent of the distribution of capital endowments whereas we know (cf. (88)
in the appendix) that the ratio of asset holdings is a decreasing function of capital
endowments for a given extraction path. Just as for the naive monopolist with asset
motive, we therefore can conclude the following:
Proposition 10. A redistribution of the capital endowment to country E ceteris paribus
will accelerate extraction in absolute terms (and thus also relative to the addiction sce-
nario which remains unaffected by the endowment redistribution) by strengthening the
capital income motive of resource supply in the first period relative to the one in the
second period.
33I.e. we must have s1Es0E < Φˆ < Φ.
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3.5.3 Omniscient vs. Purely Naive Monopoly
As in sections 3.3 and 3.4 the natural benchmark for the omniscient monopolist’s ex-
traction decision (defined by (43)) is the naive monopoly scenario N . In the following,
we characterize the additional extraction incentives of the omniscient monopolist and
their implications for the optimal extraction path by investigating the incentive of the
omniscient monopolist to deviate from reference path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) which fulfills the naive
monopolist’s Hotelling rule (49). We summarize our results in the next proposition.
Proposition 11. The omniscient monopolist exactly follows the extraction policy of
the naive monopolist if
s1E + ΨF2KR
dK2
dR2
s0E
= Φ for extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ). (73)
If
s1E+ ΨF2KR
dK2
dR2
s0E
> Φ, the omniscient monopolist chooses a more conservationist extrac-
tion path and for
s1E+ ΨF2KR
dK2
dR2
s0E
< Φ a less conservationist extraction path than the naive
monopolist.
Since full general equilibrium information affects both, the first period and the second
period marginal resource value from the monopolist’s perspective, we start by analyzing
analogue to section 3.3 when the additional information is completely neutral relative to
the standard naive monopoly case. In this sense, neutrality implies that by combining
Hotelling conditions (49) and (43)
MRGA∗2
MRGA∗1
= MR
N∗
2
MRN∗1
= 1 + iN∗2
holds for extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ). Using (44), (46) and (71) we can rearrange this
neutrality condition along the lines of (62) to get (73). The threshold Φ is known
from (62) and our discussion of the asset motive which derives solely from the com-
plementarity effect of resource supply on capital return FtKR in section 3.3.1 where we
notably based our analysis on exactly the same reference extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 )
according to (45) as in the scenario comparison at hand. Since the omniscient monop-
olist explicitly internalizes the feedback effect from capital accumulation (cf. section
3.5.1), the neutrality condition relative to the purely naive monopolist is modified for
the omniscient monopolist by including the parameter Ψ.
The interpretation of neutrality condition (73) and the conclusion about the extraction
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incentives of the omniscient monopolist in comparison with the purely naive monopolist
is completely analogue to section 3.3.1. Still, neutrality condition (73) illustrates that
the extraction decision of the omniscient monopolist is characterized by the interaction
of the asset motive (with its partial and general equilibrium components) and the ad-
diction motive. Due to the ambiguity of Ψ and the ambiguity of the partial equilibrium
asset motive which we observed in section 3.3.1 we may in principle get any ordering
of the supply scenarios of the purely naive monopolist, the naive monopolist with asset
motive and the omniscient monopolist, depending on the relative weights of the differ-
ent motives. Our previous results, however, allow us to draw the following conclusions
about the ordering and the relationship of scenarios N , NA and GA in equilibrium:
• When we evaluate neutrality condition (73) and the sign of Ψ for the optimal
extraction path (RN∗1 , RN∗2 ) in scenario N , we still generally cannot draw any
conclusion whether the omniscient monopolist extracts more or less conservation-
ist than the naive monopolist with assets. The only exception is the special case
when scenarios N and NA coincide ( s1E
s0E
= Φ).
• If Ψ = 0 and s1E
s0E
= Φ, all three scenarios, N , NA and GA, coincide, despite very
different levels of knowledge.
Similar conclusions are possible regarding scenarios N , G and GA in equilibrium, be-
cause the purely addiction motivated monopolist always chooses a less conservationist
extraction policy than the naive monopolist from scenario N :
• The extraction paths in scenarios N , G and GA can never coincide at the same
time.34
• For scenarios N and GA to coincide or GA to be more conservationist than N
(according to (73)), the omniscient monopolist must choose a more conservationist
extraction path than the purely addiction motivated monopolist from scenario G
and pursuing the general equilibrium asset motive must induce a postponement
of extraction (cf. (72)).
In line with section 3.3.1 and the discussion of neutrality condition (62), the right side
of (73) will not change with a redistribution of capital endowments, as the threshold
Φ remains unaffected. Redistributing capital endowments to country E, however, will
alter the left side and thus the extraction policy of the omniscient monopolist as the
34The same holds true for scenario NA. If s1Es0E = Φ and the naive monopolists with and without
asset motive choose exactly the same extraction path, the monopolist of scenario G pursuing only the
addiction motive will always extract less conservationist.
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following proposition summarizes.
Proposition 12. Redistributing capital endowment to country E will overall increase
the speed of extraction by the omniscient monopolist relative to the standard naive mo-
nopolist’s outcome.
Following the previous section 3.5.2 we already know that redistributing capital endow-
ment to country E always gives the omniscient monopolist an incentive to speed up
extraction compared to the monopolist pursuing only the addiction motive whose ex-
traction decision does not depend on the distribution of capital endowment. However,
since the naive monopolist does not react to any redistribution of the capital endow-
ment either, the omniscient monopolist must accelerate extraction also in comparison
with the naive monopolist’s outcome and the proposition holds.35
3.5.4 Comparison with Competitive Extraction
In the following, we again extend the characterization of the omniscient monopolist’s
supply decision by comparing it with the competitive supply path and examining
whether the omniscient monopolist may reverse the standard textbook conservationist
bias of a resource monopolist for σ < 1.
Proposition 13. The omniscient monopolist generally may choose a more or less con-
servationist extraction path than the competitive market due to the interplay of addiction
and asset motive. Iso-elastic resource demand or σ = 1 is no longer a sufficient condi-
tion for the neutrality of market power with a full level of information.
Following the reasoning in section 3.3.2 the omniscient monopolist’s extraction path
will correspond to the competitive outcome if
(1 + iC∗2 )MRGA1 = MRGA2 for the competitive extraction path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 )
35Proposition 3 showed that increasing first period’s asset holdings establishes – except for the special
case (Φ < (1 + iN∗1 ) ∂s1E∂y1E ) where the endowment distribution does not influence the effect of the asset
motives on the extraction path at all – an incentive for the naive monopolist pursuing an asset motive
to speed up extraction, too. Since both extraction policies change, we generally cannot derive any
conclusion about the influence of the endowment distribution on the comparison between scenarios
GA and NA in equilibrium.
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or by using (70), (65), (71) and (60) if
∆ˆ ≡ p
C∗
2
σ
∆ + ΨdK2
dR2
= 0 for the competitive extraction path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ). (74)
We define the parameter ∆ˆ as the general equilibrium counterpart to ∆ from (65).
In analogy to scenario NA, ∆ˆ measures the incentive of the omniscient monopolist
to deviate from the competitive outcome. The omniscient monopolist chooses a more
conservationist extraction path for ∆ˆ > 0 but speeds up extraction relative to the
competitive outcome for ∆ˆ < 0.
Obviously, whether the omniscient monopolist deviates from the competitive outcome
or not depends on the respective incentive of the naive monopolist with asset motive
(∆ from (65)) and the influence of the additional considerations which the omniscient
monopolist takes into account due to his awareness of the endogeneity of capital ac-
cumulation (Ψ from (71)). If, for example, the share of final goods’ production which
country E can capture as factor remuneration increases over time (∆ > 0) and the
naive monopolist with asset motive extracts more conservationist than the competitive
market according to (65), the omniscient monopolist will only offset the conservationist
extraction bias for Ψ > 0 due to dK2
dR2
< 0 according to (41). Intuitively, the addiction
motive must dominate sufficiently the strengthening of the second period’s asset motive
to establish a sufficient incentive for the omniscient monopolist to speed up extraction
compared to the naive monopolist with asset motive.
In general, however, we may have any combination of ∆ and Ψ so that the omniscient
monopolist can have an incentive to extract faster than the competitive market (∆ˆ < 0)
even if the scenario NA monopolist chooses a more conservationist extraction path
(∆ > 0), or vice versa.
For iso-elastic resource demand, i.e. for the case σ = 1, the factor shares θtR and θtK are
constant.36 Nevertheless, since the share of country E’s asset holdings in total capital
stock s1E
K2
is likely to change over time so that ∆ 6= 0 and, similarly, since σ = 1 does not
necessarily imply Ψ = 0, iso-elastic resource demand no longer is a sufficient condition
for the monopolistic outcome to coincide with the competitive outcome.
36Indeed, we have θtR = FtRRtFt = λ
Rt
Ft
(
Ft
Rt
)1−α
= λ and θtK = FtKKtFt = γ
Kt
Ft
(
Ft
Kt
)1−α
= γ
according to (1) because σ = 11−α = 1 implies α = 0.
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3.5.5 General Equilibrium Feedbacks and Existence
To prove the existence of an equilibrium outcome as defined by the Hotelling condition
(43) given that the conditional market equilibrium holds, we again have to consider how
the left and the right side of (43) react to a change in the extraction pattern. However,
in contrast to scenarios N and NA, the omniscient monopolist is explicitly aware of
the feedback effect in general equilibrium from the endogeneity of the capital market
equilibrium.
For the left side of condition (43), we can refer to (66) and conclude that it unam-
biguously will fall in R1 or, correspondingly, increase in R2, because we have MRGA1 =
MRNA1 and the functional relationship i(R2) in the conditional equilibrium is indepen-
dent of the respective supply scenario.
Totally differentiating the right side of condition (43) gives
dMRGA2
dR2
= dMR
NA
2
dR2
+ dΨ
dR2
dK2
dR2
+ Ψ d
2K2
(dR2)2
(75)
by using (71) and the decomposition in (70). The first term is already known from
(67) and generally of ambiguous sing. The second and third terms arise due to the
monopolist’s awareness of the general equilibrium feedback effects and measure how
this general equilibrium effects change in response to a change in the extraction path.
Both are of ambiguous sign, in general. We discuss dΨ
dR2
in more detail in appendix
B.3.1. In the last term, Ψ from (71) is generally ambiguous, as well as d2K2(dR2)2 which was
already pointed out before in section 3.4.3. As in scenario NA (s. section 3.3.3), the
ambiguity of the total derivative implies that the marginal resource value in the second
period from the omniscient monopolist’s perspective may increase in R2. However, in
the scenario at hand such an upward slope may not only arise from the influence of the
general equilibrium feedback effect on the partial equilibrium asset motive (as captured
by the first term in (75)) but also from the induced change in the general equilibrium
feedback effects which the omniscient monopolist explicitly takes into account.
We discuss the total derivative and the potential upward sloping ofMRGA2 in particular
in more detail in appendix B.3.2. This analysis suggests that an upward sloping of
MRGA2 is more likely to arise the more capital endowments are distributed to country
E ceteris paribus, just as in scenario NA. Moreover, MRGA2 tends to increase stronger
than MRNA2 if both are indeed increasing in R2.
In contrast to scenario NA, the upward sloping of MRGA2 might not only give rise to
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multiple equilibria but also to corner solutions in scenario GA. We show in appendix
B.4.5 that we have
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRGA1 < lim
R2→0
MRGA2
but we cannot exclude in general that
lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRGA1 < lim
R2→R¯
MRGA2
Thus, there need not be an equilibrium outcome for which Hotelling condition (43) is
met given that the conditional market equilibrium holds. However, the assessment of
the limits of the left and the right side of the Hotelling condition at least demonstrates
that there might be a corner solution for R2 → R¯ but not for R2 → 0, i.e. there might
only be such a corner solution that the monopolist chooses to extract the whole resource
stock just in the second period. Given that the addiction motive always works towards
an acceleration of extraction, this is only possible for a very strong second period asset
motive.37 Note that the occurrence of such a corner solution is, in general, independent
of whether we assume σ ≤ 1 or σ > 1 even though the latter ensures that final goods
production in the first period does not break down for R1 = 0.38
If there is no corner solution, the upward sloping of MRGA2 may lead to multiple equi-
libria, just as in scenarios NA and G. Due to the left side of Hotelling condition
(43) monotonously falling in R1, however, there will be at least one stable equilibrium
outcome, i.e. we will have
d(1 + i2)MRNA1
dR2
>
dMRGA2
dR2
for some extraction path (RGA∗1 , RGA∗2 ) for which Hotelling condition (43) is met. Note
that for any stable equilibrium outcome the interpretation and intuition laid out in
the previous sections and scenario comparisons hold irrespective of whether MRGA2 is
upward or downward sloping for the respective equilibrium extraction path.
37 In particular, since such a corner solution is excluded in scenario NA, it must be due to the
strengthening of the second period asset motive via the feedback effect from capital accumulation.
38If σ ≤ 1 and R2 = R¯, consumption needs of the first period are satisfied out of capital endowments
only.
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4 Numerical Simulation and Graphical Illustration
To illustrate our results, figure 1 shows the respective paths of the perceived marginal
revenue of all four scenarios from a numerical simulation. The curves show the resulting
manifestations of the effects that the respective monopolist considers in the model for
the exemplary parameters σ ≈ 0.91 (high but below 1), η = 2, β = 0.3, λ = 0.1, γ = 0.4,
A = 300 and the exemplar endowments K1 = 200, s0E = 20, s0I = 180, R¯ = 10. I.e.
we construct figure 1 by exogenously varying the extraction path within the limits of
the given resource stock and by calculating the extended marginal resource revenues
MRt and the corresponding endogenous variables. The conditional market equilibrium
holds along these marginal revenue curves which implies that the capital stock and the
interest rate i2 change along the curves. In particular, there is a unique and specific
second period capital stock for the extraction paths feasible within the given resource
constraint. The width of the diagram is defined by the resource stock available so that
we can include both sides of the respective Hotelling condition into one figure. The
overall equilibrium and optimal extraction path is obviously defined by the point of
intersection of the first and the second period marginal revenue curves.
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Figure 1: Marginal revenues for all four analyzed scenarios in comparison
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Compared to scenario N , the asset motive of scenario NA induces the monopolist
to speed up extraction. The vertical difference between the revenue curves exactly
measures the influence of the asset motive. In scenario NA, the second-period marginal
revenue curve with assets does indeed not fall monotonously in R2 but exhibits a slightly
upward sloping part for high values of R2, which illustrates the analytical ambiguity
of (67), that results from the asset motive in general equilibrium. An even stronger
upward sloping part due to an enhanced asset motive is visible for scenario GA. Such
an upward sloping part is more likely with higher capital endowments to country E,
which also tends to accelerate extraction ceteris paribus.
In scenario G the monopolist speeds up extraction compared to the standard monopoly
case due to the addiction motive. If we compare the shape of both marginal revenue
curves MRN2 and MRG2 , the figure also demonstrates the influence of the capital ac-
cumulation feedback on the marginal revenue MRG2 . While MRG2 strongly declines
for high R2 due to the internalization of the increasingly strong feedback effects from
capital accumulation, these effects are overcompensated in scenario GA by the asset
motive related general equilibrium effects.
The conservationist extraction bias from naive monopoly power relative to the compe-
tition case is dampened by the asset motive in scenario NA (∆ > 0) and even reversed
for the omniscient monopolist (∆ˆ < 0) and the monopolist in the addiction scenario G.
5 The Role of the Elasticity of Substitution σ
As the interplay of the resource market and the capital market is the central field of
analysis in our paper, a change in the substitution parameter is of direct importance
for the considered effects. In the following we use the numerical simulation to vary the
elasticity of factor substitution, discuss the impact on the equilibrium outcomes of the
different scenarios and thus to elaborate on the role of the substitution elasticity in our
model.
5.1 Influence of σ on the Equilibrium Extraction Path
The influence of the elasticity of substitution on the equilibrium extraction paths in all
four treated monopoly cases and in the competition case is visible in figure 2. Evidently,
it varies substantially.
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Figure 2: Dependence of the equilibrium present extraction rates on the elasticity of
substitution σ between R and K
The dashed vertical line marks the value of approximately σ = 0.091, which was used
in the numerical simulation of the scenarios above. The order of scenarios is mostly
constant over the range of σ, but we see two intersection points for σ ≤ 1: As mentioned
in section 3.2, the equilibrium extraction path of the naive monopoly case N coincides
with the one of the competition case for σ = 1 (isoelastic resource demand). And the
second intersection is between cases N and NA (at roughly σ = 0.98). This is the point
where the asset motive as described in section 3.3.1 is exactly neutral and does not lead
to any extraction shift at all, compared to scenario N .39
The curves of the monopoly cases in figure 2 all end between σ = 0.87 and σ = 0.91.
While σ is falling, the marginal revenues of all cases are going down, finally reaching zero
at the end of the respective curve. For lower values of σ the marginal revenue would
become negative and the optimization problem changes in the way that it becomes
favorable for the monopolist to leave some resource in the ground. This regime change is
39Keep in mind here, that the neutrality threshold Φ and the level of savings s1E depend on σ
themselves.
57
beyond the scope of this paper. The marginal revenue in the competitive case goes down
as well, but it can never hit zero, since the marginal products with a CES production
function are always positive.
5.2 Present Extraction Falling with a Decrease in σ
A reduction in the substitution elasticity obviously causes a decrease in the present
extraction rate R1 in the competitive case. And since this effect is transmitted over
the marginal product of the resource in each period, which plays a prominent role in
every modification of the Hotelling rule, it affects the four monopoly cases as well. For
higher values of σ all scenarios exhibit mostly the same extraction shift to the future as
σ goes down. But for lower values of σ mechanisms, which cause the divergence of the
scenario outcomes (discussed in the next section), more and more dominate the pure
extraction shift to the future. First of all, with a decrease in σ, all marginal products
are reduced. But in the competitive case the first period’s marginal revenue in current
terms (1 + i2)p1 experiences a stronger reduction through the movement in both, i2
and p1, than the second period’s marginal revenue p2, although p1 alone goes down less
than p2. As a result, the extraction path shifts towards the higher marginal revenue in
the future.
5.3 Divergence of Scenarios with a Reduction in σ
Another striking feature of the plot is the increasing divergence of the scenario out-
comes with sinking values for σ. While the difference between the cases for σ > 1
is almost negligible (except for scenario G, whose addiction motive (see section 3.4.1)
is persistent), it grows substantially for lower σ. This divergence is explained by two
factors: An accelerated extraction shift to the future in the ’naive’ scenario N and
an increasing shift to the present in scenario G. The scenarios NA and GA exhibit
additional deviations from their ’base cases’ N and G due to the asset motive, but do
not change the divergence finding dramatically.
As we have already seen in section 3.2, the naive monopoly scenario N generally fea-
tures a more conservationist extraction path compared to the competition case. But
this difference increases with a falling substitution elasticity σ. When monopoly power
is ’switched on’ in the competitive equilibrium, then the resulting imbalance in the
monopolist’s Hotelling rule must be sorted out through an extraction shift to the fu-
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ture and the according adjustment of both periods’ marginal revenues. However, the
adjustment reaction of the marginal revenue depends itself on σ (cf. (47) and (57)).
While dp2
dR2
is the reaction function of the marginal revenue of the competitive case to a
shift in R2, the factor in front of it falls almost linearly with a reduction in σ until it
reaches zero shortly below σ = 0.9. As a result, the extraction shift, that is necessary
to achieve a certain movement of the marginal revenue in the monopoly case, rises
approximately in a hyperbolic manner, as we see in figure 2 for the curve of scenario
N . 40
On the other hand, the curves of scenario G and of the full general equilibrium case GA
are convex and a reduction in σ prompts a smaller postponement of extraction than we
see in the competitive case and, finally, even an increase in present extraction, when
further reducing the elasticity of substitution. The addiction motive, as it is described in
section 3.4.1, is reinforced through the reduction in σ. The corresponding negative term
∂p2
∂R2
dK2
dR2
R2 in this scenario’s marginal revenue is increased in absolute terms. This fast
growth in the addiction motive obviously overcompensates the extraction postponement
of the scenarios N and NA, that follows from the reduction in σ, in this simulation
example and leads to ever higher extraction rates in the present, the further the elasticity
of substitution is reduced. As we have seen in 3.4.2, while the outcome of scenario
G always exhibits a higher present extraction than the naive monopoly of scenario
N , it does not necessarily have to feature even a higher present extraction than the
competition case, but can rather also lie between the outcomes of scenario N and
competition.
6 Conclusion
We provide an analysis of monopoly power on the market for a crucial resource like
oil in general equilibrium with elastic demand. The formal analysis is enhanced with
a numerical simulation of the model. Our model framework takes the impact of oil
extraction on the endogenous interest rate, output and capital accumulation into ac-
count, as well as the resulting complex effects on resource demand and again on the
40The σ-depending factor in (47) and (57), that dampens the necessary adjustment reaction of the
monopolist’s marginal revenue, is overlain by the increasing demand elasticity ∂∂R2 > 0 in equation
(51) during the extraction shift, that increases the effect of a shift in R2 on MRN2 and thus alleviates
the adjustment of the monopolist’s Hotelling rule. However, this alleviation melts down itself with a
reduction in σ, so that a low dMR
N
2
dR2
remains.
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interest rate. As a central contribution of the paper, we find that the monopolist’s level
of knowledge about the different effect channels, feedback effects and economic struc-
tures in the general equilibrium setup is crucial for his choice of the optimal extraction
path from his respective view. We change his level of awareness in steps to define and
analyze four scenarios and to make the influence of different parts of the monopolist’s
knowledge on his resource extraction decision more transparent. Finally, the scenario
GA incorporates complete knowledge about the whole economic structure on the side
of the monopolist and constitutes a case of comprehensive general equilibrium resource
monopoly.
In the naive monopoly case (scenario N), as in a partial equilibrium model, where
the monopolist only knows the resource demand behavior, monopoly power leads to a
postponement of extraction if the according competitive extraction path is falling over
time and capital accumulation is positive. This classical conservationist bias of the
monopoly, however, is put in question as the extraction shift of the monopolist relative
to the competitive outcome becomes ambiguous if capital accumulation is negative, or if
the competitive extraction path is upward sloping (due to high enough positive capital
accumulation).
Knowledge about the impact of resource extraction on the capital accumulation dynam-
ics and the resulting changes in resource demand in scenario G lead to the emergence of
an unambiguous ’addiction motive’: Taking into account this aspect of interconnected-
ness of the capital market and the resource market, the monopolist is less conservationist
than the naive monopolist of scenario N and shifts the extraction path to the present
(for dK2
dR2
< 0). The higher resource supply in the present leads to more output and
capital accumulation in the present and a higher dependence on the resource in the
future, that can be exploited strategically by the exporter. The strength of the ad-
diction motive in the monopolist’s considerations depends on the relationship between
changes in resource extraction in period 1 and the resulting changes in resource demand
(via capital accumulation) in period 2. This acceleration of extraction due to general
equilibrium knowledge can even lead to faster extraction under monopoly than in the
perfect competition case, so that Robert Solow’s (1974) dictum of the monopolist being
’the conservationist’s friend’ can be reversed. Also, it is possible that the monopolist
chooses the social optimum extraction path of the competition case. Moreover, even
for an isoelastic resource demand (i.e. elasticity of substitution between capital and
resource σ = 1) the extraction shift to the present persists and the resulting extraction
paths of monopoly and competitive case cease to be identical, in contrast to the usual
partial equilibrium setup.
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Another striking result of our analysis of resource market power in general equilibrium
is the emergence of what we call the ’capital asset motive’. The investment of a part
of the resource revenues from period 1 leads to the build up of a capital asset stock by
the resource exporting country, akin to the recycling of petrodollars and the creation
of sovereign wealth funds and other capital deposits, that we have seen in the last
decades by many OPEC countries. As a result, returns on capital investments are
added as a second income source and the role of the classical resource monopolist, as
he is known from the literature, changes to that of a simultaneous resource extractor
and capital investor. In scenario NA the monopolist first knows about his direct power
over the future interest rate and then, in scenario GA, even about the whole capital
market dynamics, which affect his capital income. Taking this asset motive into account
can shift the monopolist’s optimal extraction path to the future or to the present. The
direction of the shift depends on the initial capital endowments and on the rate of growth
of the resource exporting country’s share in the world capital asset stock. Put differently,
the relative ’strength’ of the asset motive in both periods determines the direction
of the extraction shift. In scenario GA with its full general equilibrium dynamics
being considered by the monopolist, the future period’s asset motive is stronger than
in scenario NA with its lower level of the monopolist’s awareness. Thresholds for
the change in direction of the extraction shift when switching from one scenario to
another are provided. Another interesting phenomenon, for both scenarios NA and
GA, is that the monopolist’s marginal resource revenue in period 2 can develop an
area with a positive slope in resource extraction R2, in contrast to the normal falling
marginal revenue in a case without an asset motive. The conclusions that we draw
in the different sections, however, refer to constellations where the marginal revenue
curves in both periods fall in a conventional manner.
The analysis of the strategic capital asset motive makes dynamic changes in the role of
a resource exporter with market power visible. Starting as a pure resource exporter, the
monopolist over time turns into a capital investor with influence on the capital market
via his resource market power. The pure resource revenues may become secondary
during this process. A change of strategic incentives and political priorities of OPEC
countries over the decades in their competition with industrialized countries in the
political arena can be made plausible in this way.
Both, the asset motive and the addiction motive constitute different aspects of the
mutual dependency of oil exporters and importers. The industrialized countries are not
simply at the exporter’s mercy, but the monopolist’s interest in the importing countries’
prosperity is at the least twofold: On the one hand, the exporter wants to maintain and
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increase the importers’ ’oil addiction’ for the future. On the other hand, he does not
want to jeopardize his capital asset returns. The general equilibrium perspective has
proven very useful for gaining insights, not only into the strategic relation of resource
exporters and importers, but also into the complex interlocking of capital and resource
markets (especially for oil). Our analysis thus contributes to a better understanding
of the supply motives and strategies of suppliers of fossil energy resources and of the
conditions of successful climate policy.
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A Appendix: Model
A.1 Capital Supply
A.1.1 General Characterization
Without assuming symmetric and homothetic consumption preferences for both coun-
tries, aggregated capital supply is given by
Ks2 = Ks2(y1I , y1E, pi2I , pi2E, i2) = s1I(y1I , pi2I , i2) + s1E(y1E, pi2E, i2) (76)
Totally differentiating aggregate capital supply yields
dKs2 =
∂s1I
∂y1I
dy1I +
∂s1I
∂pi2I
dpi2I +
∂s1I
∂i2
di2 +
∂s1E
∂y1E
dy1E +
∂s1E
∂pi2E
dpi2E +
∂s1E
∂i2
di2
However, in both countries, period income streams are functions of factor prices and
quantities as well as capital endowment. For describing the fundamental functional
form of aggregate capital supply we therefore have to further decompose the changes in
period income streams in both countries. To this end, we totally differentiate y1E from
(21) and pi2E from (18) which gives
dy1E = p1dR1 +R1dp1 + s0Edi1 + (1 + i1)ds0E
dpi2E = p2dR2 +R2dp2
(77)
Similarly, for country I, totally differentiating period income streams y1I from (11) and
pi2I from (5) yields
dy1I = F1RdR1 + F1KdK1 − p1dR1 −R1dp1 − i1dK1 −K1di1 + s0Idi1 + (1 + i1)ds0I =
= −R1dp1 −K1di1 + s0Idi1 + (1 + i1)ds0I
dpi2I = F2RdR2 + F2KdK2 − p2dR2 −R2dp2 − i2dK2 −K2di2 =
= −R2dp2 −K2di2
(78)
where we set FtR = pt and FtK = it according to (7) and (6) which both hold due to
the Envelope theorem. However, note, that since households in both countries derive
their period incomes from supplying production factors and the production technology
exhibits constant returns to scale (cf. (5)), aggregate period income that is available for
consumption and savings in period 1 is made up of total output and capital endowments
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for period 1
Y1 = y1I + y1E = pi1I + (1 + i1)s0I + pi1E + (1 + i1)s0E = F1 +K1
and just of total output for period 2
Π2 = pi2I + pi2E = F2
Thus, changes in factor prices do not (directly) influence aggregate period incomes,
unless they induce changes in factor inputs.
Given (77) and (78) we can conclude that aggregate capital supply is, in the end, a
function factor prices, resource input and asset endowments:
Ks2 = Ks2(p1, p2, i1, i2, R1, R2, s0I , s0E) (79)
Correspondingly, by use of (77) and (78), we may rearrange the total derivative of (76)
to get
dKs2 =
(
∂s1E
∂y1E
− ∂s1I
∂y1I
)
R1dp1 +
(
∂s1E
∂pi2E
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
)
R2dp2
+
(
∂s1E
∂y1E
s0E +
∂s1I
∂y1I
s0I − ∂s1I
∂y1I
K1
)
di1 +
(
∂s1E
∂i2
+ ∂s1I
∂i2
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2
)
di2
+ ∂s1E
∂y1E
p1dR1 +
∂s1E
∂pi2E
p2dR2 +
∂s1I
∂y1I
(1 + i1)ds0I +
∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + i1)ds0E
(80)
where exogenous changes in first-period capital endowments s0m are taken into account
for completeness. Obviously, with an higher capital endowment households have an
incentive to save more and to enlarge capital supply.
Given the constant return to scale technology, factor prices determine the distribution
of the value added from production between all production factors. However, since
households from country E and I supply different factors and labour income is defined
as residual profits according to (5), factor prices also determine the distribution of
aggregate income between both countries. Therefore, as far as countries differ in their
propensity to save with respect to income changes, factor prices do influence capital
supply, even though they do not directly change aggregate (world) income. With fixed
factor inputs, an increase in the resource price (for whatever reason) reduces labour
income (cf. (5)) and therefore shifts income from country I to country E in both
periods. If households in country E react stronger to the income gain with respect to
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savings than households in I to their income loss, then an increase in the first period
resource price will boost capital supply as the first term on the right in (80) shows.
Correspondingly, with an increase in the second period resource price capital supply
will be reduced.
For the influence of the interest rate – the factor price of capital – note, that an increase
in the interest rate raises the return from capital holdings (endowments or savings) of
households in both countries and in both periods. However, higher capital income is
directly at the expense of labour income according to (5). Thus, whenever country E
owns part of the capital stock, a higher interest rate also involves a redistributive effect
between countries, because households in country I will earn only a part of the increased
capital costs as capital income if everything else is held constant. In fact, with fixed
capital endowments, the first period interest rate has an influence on capital supply (for
the second period) only via its redistributive effect as the aggregate change in exogenous
capital endowment equals a change in the first period capital stock ds0I + ds0E = dK1
so that
∂s1E
∂y1E
s0E +
∂s1I
∂y1I
s0I − ∂s1I
∂y1I
K1 =
(
∂s1E
∂y1E
− ∂s1I
∂y1I
)
s0E
The redistributive effect from labour income in country I to capital income in country
E also holds for the effect the second period interest rate has on aggregate savings
which can be observed by substituting for the partial derivatives with respect to the
interest rate from (16)
∂s1E
∂i2
+ ∂s1I
∂i2
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2 = −βu
′(c2E)
∆E
+ ∂s1E
∂pi2E
s1E − βu
′(c2I)
∆I
+ ∂s1I
∂pi1I
s1I − ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2
= −βu
′(c2E)
∆E
− βu
′(c2I)
∆I
+
(
∂s1E
∂pi2E
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
)
s1E
However, the second period interest rate applies to capital holdings the households
actively decide on. The redistributive effect derives from the standard (negative) income
effect, that a rising interest rate has for given savings. Again, since households in
country I earn labour and capital income, the overall standard income effect is at least
attenuated as some parts of the gains in capital income are compensated by the loss
in labour income. In addition, the first two positive terms capture the counteracting
substitution effects on savings in both countries. Hence, the overall effect of the second-
period interest rate on capital supply is generally ambiguous.
Increasing first period resource supply (dR1) raises first period production marginally
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by p1 = F1R. The same holds true for second period resource supply (dR2). Since
country E completely captures the production value of its resources due to the constant
returns to scale technology, these resource supply induced changes of total output in the
respective period only affect savings of households of country E by the corresponding
income effects as the third line in (80) demonstrates. In contrast to an increase in first
period income any increase in second period income pi2E lowers savings from country E
according to (16).
However, since we assume that the resource constraint (17) is binding in any case, we
have R1 = R¯−R2 and shifting resources to the second period always is associated with
a decreasing resource use in the first period, i.e. dR1 = −dR2. This implies that capital
supply, in its most general specification, is a function of factor prices, the resource
supply path, as well as the resource and capital endowments
Ks2 = Ks2(p1, p2, i1, i2, R2, R¯, s0I , s0E) (81)
and the third the third line in (80) is overall modified by having
(
∂s1E
∂pi2E
p2 − ∂s1E
∂y1E
p1
)
dR2 +
∂s1E
∂y1E
p1dR¯
For given factor prices, resource income of country E rises in the second period while it
shrinks in the first period according to (77) when shifting resources to the second period.
This unambiguously lowers savings from country E given the partial effects in (16).
For a given production technology (and given capital stocks) the resource constraint
implies that reallocating resources to the future shifts total production output and
thereby aggregate income from the present to the future. However, since country E
completely captures the production value of its resources, the induced redistribution
of aggregate income directly corresponds to changes in period incomes of country E
so that the reallocation of resources between both periods only affects savings from
country E ceteris paribus.41 The effect of an increase in the resource stock dR¯ which is
directly comparable to an increase in capital endowments.
A.1.2 Capital Supply for Homothetic Preferences
To simplify this so far very general characterization of capital supply in (80) we assume
symmetric and homothetic consumption preferences for households in both countries
41i.e. not taking into changes of the interest rate.
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m ∈ {E, I} in the model (see (10)). From the Euler equations (14) and (22) then
follows
c1m
c2m
= [β (1 + i2)]−
1
η (82)
i.e. along the optimal intertemporal consumption path, the relation of first and second-
period consumption only depends on the time preference and the interest rate but not
on the income level. Moreover, this implies that for a given present-value of life-time
income
wm = y1m +
pi2m
1 + i2
= c1m +
c2m
1 + i2
(83)
only the prevailing interest rate and the time preference rate determine the expenditures
that the household dedicates to first and second period consumption42
c1m =
1 + i2
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
wm
c2m =
β
1
η (1 + i2)
1
η
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
wm
For η = 1 (ln-utility), the income and substitution effect of a changing interest rate
exactly offset each other and the expenditure share for first-period consumption no
longer depends on the interest rate.
From (16) we already observed that the marginal propensities to save with respect
to income changes are constant in both countries for a given interest rate and do not
depend on the absolute income levels. Since the preferences of the two countries are not
only homothetic, but also symmetric, the distribution of income between the countries
has no effect on the saving propensities, nor on the total amount of savings. For any
distribution of wealth between country E and country I we therefore have
∂s1I
∂y1I
= ∂s1E
∂y1E
and ∂s1I
∂pi1I
= ∂s1E
∂pi1E
but not necessarily ∂s1I
∂i2
= ∂s1E
∂i2
.
This implies that all terms representing pure redistribution of income between countries
I and E cancel out. Moreover, the distribution of capital endowments between both
countries no longer has any influence on capital supply as well as any exertion of market
power. Thus, based on (81) capital supply with symmetric homothetic preferences in
42The expenditure shares can be derived by substituting for the second-period consumption in (83)
from the Euler equation.
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both countries is just a function of the second period interest rate, the resource supply
path, as well as resource and capital endowments as stated in (25). An overview over
the different components of the aggregate savings reaction for the case of symmetric
homothetic utility is given in figure 3.
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Figure 3: Overview over the reaction of aggregate savings for homothetic utility to a
shift in resource supply dR2
A.2 Conditional Market Equilibrium
A.2.1 Comparative Statics
In the conditional market equilibrium, all three markets, the resource market, the capi-
tal market and the final goods’ market, clear given some resource supply path (R1, R2).
To derive (35) and (36) we totally differentiate (31) and substitute dRd1 from (6) which
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gives
F1KK
Γ dp1 −
F1KR
Γ di1 = −dR2
where Γ is positive according to (4) and where we use dR1 = −dR2 by the binding
resource constraint (17). Setting
di1 =
F1KR
F1RR
dp1
by totally differentiating (29) we get (35) and finally (36).
For the second period, we start by totally differentiating (32) which yields
dp2
dR2
= Γ
F2KK
+ F2KR
F2KK
di2
dR2
(84)
In equilibrium, this has to coincide with
dp2
dR2
= − Γ
F2KR
dKs2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
+ 1
F2KR
[
F2RR − Γ dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
]
di2
dR2
from totally differentiating (30) by use of (6) and (26). Due to the exogeneity of capital
and resource endowments, we have dK1 = dR¯ = 0. Note that we have dK
s
2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
=(
∂s1E
∂pi2E
p2 − ∂s1E∂y1E p1
)
from (28) and dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
=
(
∂s1E
∂i2
+ ∂s1I
∂i2
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2
)
from (27).
By equating and rearranging we get for the induced change in the equilibrium interest
rate
di2
dR2
=
F2KR + F2KK dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
1− F2KK dK2di2
∣∣∣
R2
(85)
and by substituting for di2
dR2
in (84)
dp2
dR2
=
F2RR − Γ dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
+ F2KR dK
s
2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
1− F2KK dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
(86)
Thus, the interest rate unambiguously reacts positively to a shift of resources from the
first to the second period whereas the resource price unambiguously falls at the same
time, even though we account for the influence of resource supply on capital accumula-
tion, which is generally ambiguous due to counteracting income and substitution effects,
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and for the complementarity of capital and resources in production. This is due to the
strict concavity of the production technology which ensures that Γ > 0 holds.
A.2.2 Sign of dK2
dR2
First, given that the conditional market equilibrium and in particular final goods market
equilibrium from section 2.4.3 holds, we can rewrite the aggregate substitution effect in
(27)
dKs2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,K1
= ∂s1I
∂i2
+ ∂s1E
∂i2
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
K2
= 1
η(1 + i2)
· c2I + c2E
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
= 1
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
F2 +K2
η(1 + i2)
and the aggregate income effect in (28)
dKs2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2,K1
= ∂s1E
∂pi2E
p2 − ∂s1E
∂y1E
p1 = − [β(1 + i2)]
1
η p1 + p2
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
Given (39) and (38) we know that
dK2
dR2
= dK
s
2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2,K1
+ dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,K1
[
F2KR + F2KK
dK2
dR2
]
Rearranging and defining Ω = 1− F2KK dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2,K1
, we then have
dK2
dR2
=
dKs2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2,K1
+ F2KR dK
s
2
di2
∣∣∣
R2,K1
Ω
= 1Ω
1
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
[
F2KR
F2 +K2
η(1 + i2)
−
(
[β(1 + i2)]
1
η p1 + p2
)]
= 1Ω
1
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
{
p2
[
i2
1 + i2
F2 +K2
σηF2
− 1
]
− (β(1 + i2))
1
η p1
}
= 1
1 + i2 + (β(1 + i2))
1
η − F2KK F2+K2η(1+i2)
{
p2
[
i2
1 + i2
F2 +K2
σηF2
− 1
]
− (β(1 + i2))
1
η p1
}
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Since the denominator is unambiguously positive, a necessary condition for dK2
dR2
< 0 is
1
ση
<
(1 + i2)F2
i2F2 + i2K2
{
[β(1 + i2)]
1
η
p1
p2
+ 1
}
Note that the right side is greater than unity because i2K2 < F2 and [β(1 + i2)]
1
η > 0.
Therefore, a sufficient condition for dK2
dR2
< 0 is
ση ≥ 1
In the intertemporal final goods market equilibrium (see section 2.4.3) we may substi-
tute for
[β(1 + i2)]
1
η = c2I + c2E
c1I + c1E
= F2 +K2
F1 +K1 −K2
in the necessary condition to get
1
ση
<
1 + i2
i2
F2
p2
[
p1
F1 +K1 −K2 +
p2
F2 +K2
]
Figure 4 shows the reactions of the period 2 interest rate and capital stock for an
increase in future extraction R2.
A.2.3 The savings reactions of country E and I to a change in the resource
supply path
Households in country E react to a change in the resource supply path, i.e. when
observing an intertemporal redistribution of the given resource stock, according to
ds1E
dR2
= ∂s1E
∂y1E
∂y1E
∂R1
dR1
dR2
+ ∂s1E
∂pi2E
dpi2E
dR2
+ ∂s1E
∂i2
di2
dR2
= −∂s1E
∂y1E
(
MRN1 + F1KRs0E
)
+ ∂s1E
∂pi2E
(
p2 +
dp2
dR2
R2
)
+ ∂s1E
∂pi2E
s1E
di2
dR2
− βu
′(c2E)
∆E
di2
dR2
= ∂s1E
∂pi2E
{
[β(1 + i2)]
1
η MRNA1 +
(
p2 +
dp2
dR2
R2
)
+
[
s1E − pi2E + (1 + i2)s1E
η(1 + i2)
]
di2
dR2
}
= ∂s1E
∂pi2E
{
[β(1 + i2)]
1
η MRNA1 +MRGA2 −
pi2E + (1 + i2)s1E
η(1 + i2)
di2
dR2
}
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Figure 4: Reaction of the capital stock and the interest rate to a change in R2 over the
extraction rate R2 for parameter values σ ≈ 0.9, η = 2, β = 0.3, λ = 0.1, φ = 0.4,
K1 = 200, R¯ = 10.
Note that we substituted for ∂s1E
∂i2
as we know from the implicit definition of the savings
function in (16) for homothetic preferences that
∂s1E
∂i2
= ∂s1E
∂pi2E
[
s1E − pi2E + (1 + i2)s1E
η(1 + i2)
]
The savings reaction is generally of ambiguous sign and depends on the level of resource
income streams in both periods and the capital endowments s0E.
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Correspondingly, the savings reaction of households in country I is given by
ds1I
dR2
= ∂s1I
∂y1I
∂y1I
∂R1
dR1
dR2
+ ∂s1I
∂pi2I
dpi2I
dR2
+ ∂s1I
∂i2
di2
dR2
= −∂s1I
∂y1I
[
F1R − p1 − ∂p1
∂R1
R1 − ∂i1
∂R1
K1 +
∂i1
∂R1
s0I
]
+ ∂s1I
∂pi2I
[
dF2
dR2
− p2 − dp2
dR2
R2 − di2
dR2
K2 − i2dK2
dR2
]
+ ∂s1I
∂i2
di2
dR2
= ∂s1I
∂y1I
[
∂p1
∂R1
R1 +
∂i1
∂R1
s1E
]
+ ∂s1I
∂pi2I
[
s1I
di2
dR2
− pi1I + (1 + i2)s1I
η(1 + i2)
di2
dR2
]
+ ∂s1I
∂pi2I
[
F2R + F2K
dK2
dR2
− p2 − dp2
dR2
R2 − di2
dR2
K2 − i2dK2
dR2
]
= ∂s1I
∂pi2I
{
− [β(1 + i2)]
1
η [F1RRR1 + F1KRs0E]−
[
dp2
dR2
R2 +
di2
dR2
s1E
]}
− ∂s1I
∂pi2I
{
pi2I + (1 + i2)s1I
η(1 + i2)
di2
dR2
}
= ∂s1I
∂pi2I
{
− [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
[
MRNA1 − p1
]
−
[
MRGA2 − p2
]
− pi2I + (1 + i2)s1I
η(1 + i2)
di2
dR2
}
where we again set ∂s1I
∂i2
= ∂s1I
∂pi2I
[
s1I − pi2I+(1+i2)s1Iη(1+i2)
]
due to the symmetry of preferences.
Furthermore, we use s1I = K2 − s1E and dF2dR2 = F2R + F2K dK2dR2 .
Figure 5 shows these savings functions for the numerical simulation which is used in
the scenario analysis.
B Appendix: Scenario Analysis
B.1 Scenario NA
B.1.1 Relationship of capital endowment s0E and savings s1E in country E
We show in the following, that savings s1E are linearly increasing in capital endowment if
capital endowments are redistributed from country I to country E for a given extraction
path and a given overall first period capital stock K1.
Due to our assumption of symmetric homothetic preferences, overall capital accumula-
tion is just a function of the extraction path and the first period capital stock K1 ((26)
and (39)). This implies that for any given extraction path the interest rates in both
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Figure 5: Country E’s s1E, country I’s savings s1I and the resulting capital stock K2
over the extraction rate R2 for parameter values σ ≈ 0.9, η = 2, β = 0.3, λ = 0.1,
φ = 0.4, K1 = 200, R¯ = 10.
periods i1, i2 and the period resource income streams pi1E, pi2E from (18) are determined
and independent of any redistribution of capital endowment. In contrast, overall first
period household income y1E from (21) still depends on the capital endowment s0E.
For a given extraction path and given K1, we therefore can decompose savings as a
function of endowments
s1E(s0E) = s1E(0) +
∂s1E
∂s0E
s0E = s1E(0) +
∂s1E
∂y1E
∂y1E
∂s0E
s0E = s1E(0) +
∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )s0E
(87)
where the marginal savings propensity with respect to increases in first period household
income, ∂s1E
∂y1E
from (16), is a positive constant (again greater or lower than unity).
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Using this functional relationship, we observe from
∂ s1E
s0E
∂s0E
∣∣∣∣∣
K1,R1,R2
= 1
s0E
[
∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )−
s1E
s0E
]
= −s1E(0)
s20E
< 0
that the ration of asset holdings falls upon redistributing capital endowment to country
E. Moreover, we can characterize the influence of an (ceteris paribus) increase in
endowment s0E on the ratio of second to first period capital holdings by considering
the limits
lim
s0E→0
s1E
s0E
∣∣∣∣
K1,R1,R2
= lim
s0E→0
[
s1E(0)
s0E
+ ∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )
]
= +∞
lim
s0E→∞
s1E
s0E
∣∣∣∣
K1,R1,R2
= lim
s0E→∞
[
s1E(0)
s0E
+ ∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )
]
= ∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )
lim
s0E→K1
s1E
s0E
∣∣∣∣
K1,R1,R2
= s1E(K1)
K1
= s1E(0)
K1
+ ∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 ) >
∂s1E
∂y1E
(1 + iN∗1 )
(88)
B.1.2 Reaction of the Hotelling Condition to Changes in R2
In this section, we discuss the effective change of the left and the right side of the
modified Hotelling condition (45) in general equilibrium. The left side given by (66)
monotonously falls R1 taking into account the resource constraint (17), or, equivalently,
increases in R2 for a given capital endowment s0E and given capital stock K1. The first
term is unambiguously of negative sign for MRNAt ≥ 0 because we have43
∂MRNAt
∂Rt
∣∣∣∣∣
s(t−1)E ,Kt
= 1
σ
1
Rt
[
(θtR − 1)MRNAt + (1− σ)θtR
(
MRNAt − FtR
)]
< 0 (89)
as θtR < 1 and MRNAt < FtR due to the Euler theorem.44
For the right side of the modified Hotelling condition (58), the effective total reaction of
the second period marginal revenueMRNA2 in general equilibrium to a shift of resources
to the second period is given by (67) and of ambiguous sign. This ambiguity arises due
to the second and the third term, whereas the first term represents the ceteris paribus
43From (60) we get for given asset holdings and given capital stock
∂MRNAt
∂Rt
∣∣∣∣
s(t−1)E ,Kt
= FtRR
σ
[
θtR + θtK
s(t−1)E
Kt
− (1− σ)
]
+ FtR
σ
[
∂θtR
∂Rt
+ ∂θtK
∂Rt
s(t−1)E
Kt
]
Using ∂θtR∂Rt =
σ−1
σ
FtR
Ft
(1− θtR) and ∂θtK∂Rt = 1−σσ FtRFt θtK and rearranging by use of (60) yields (89).
44We have MRNAt − FtR = p2σ
[
θtR + θtK
s(t−1)E
Kt
− 1
]
< 0.
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influence of resource supply and is unambiguously negative for MRNA2 according to
(89). The second term captures the feedback effect from capital accumulation. Given
dK2
dR2
< 0 according to (41), the sign of the second term depends on the ceteris paribus
influence of capital on the modified marginal resource value45
∂MRNA2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
s1E ,R2
= ∂MR
N
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
+ ∂F2KR
∂K2
s1E
= F2KR
σ
[
(1− σ)
(
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− 1
)
+ θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
] (90)
which is generally ambiguous. The first term in the first line is positive for MRN2 > 0
according to (48) which on the one hand no longer needs to be the case for the naive
monopolist with asset motive as MRNA2 > MRN2 . On the other hand, MRN2 > 0 also
implies that the second term is negative and thereby counteracting the first.46
From the second line, we can conclude that a sufficient condition for (90) to be negative
is
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
≤ 0 (91)
where θ2R+θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 may be positive or negative, in general.47 A necessary condition
is
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
<
1− σ
2− σ
(
1− s1E
K2
)
where the right side is non-negative for σ < 1.
The third term in (67) captures the feedback from the induced change in asset holdings
in the second period where we have ∂MR
NA
2
∂s1E
∣∣∣∣
R2,K2
= F2KR > 0. Since a change in
the extraction path leads to changes in the interest rate and the period incomes of
households, this savings reaction is generally of ambiguous sign, due to counteracting
substitution and income effects (see also appendix A.2.3).
In the following, we discuss the influence of capital endowment s0E on the total reaction
45The second line is derived from ∂MR
N
2
∂K2
∣∣∣
R2
from (48) and ∂F2KR∂K2 =
2−σ
σ
F2RK
K2
(
θ2K − 12−σ
)
dK2
dR2
.
46For MRN2 > 0 we have θ2R > 1 − σ. By the Euler theorem, we then must have θ2K < 12−σ and
therefore ∂F2KR∂K2 =
2−σ
σ
F2KR
K2
[
θ2K − 12−σ
]
< 0.
47Note that θ2R+θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 ≤ 0 also implies that the marginal revenue curve plotted for scenario
NA lies below the marginal revenue curve of scenario GA for a given extraction path (R1, R2).
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(67). By analyzing the limits, we can show, thatMRNA2 approachesMRN2 for R2 → 0.48
Given that MRN2 falls in R2 according to (57), this implies that MRNA2 may only
increase inR2 for rather highR2. If we assume thatMRNA2 ≥ 0 for all feasible extraction
paths within the resource constraint R¯, the first term in (67) is always negative so that
the right side in (58) may only increase if the second and/or the third term positively
contribute to the slope in (67). However, since the savings reaction of households in
country E is entirely ambiguous in general, we focus on the second term, the influence
of the capital dynamics, where we assume throughout that condition (41) holds and
therefore that dK2
dR2
< 0.
Given (67) and dK2
dR2
< 0 for ση ≥ 1, the capital dynamics positively contribute to the
slope of the marginal revenue curve if the partial or ceteris paribus effect of capital
accumulation on the modified marginal revenue ∂MR
NA
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣
R2,s1E
from (90) is negative, at
least for high R2. From the discussion of the ambiguity of (90) we know that the sign
of this partial influence of capital on MRNAt strongly depends on the ambiguous term
θ2R + θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 . For any given extraction path (R1, R2), this term is, however, a
function of capital endowment. Whereas overall capital accumulation and thereby the
factor shares θ2R, θ2K do not directly depend on the distribution of capital endowments
for symmetric homothetic preferences, savings are ceteris paribus – for a given extraction
path and a given aggregated capital endowment K1 – a positive and linear function of
households capital endowment s0E (see (87)). Since θ2K < 1 by the Euler theorem,
redistributing capital endowments to country E, therefore, ceteris paribus tends to
lower the term θ2R+θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 . Thus, the partial influence of capital on the marginal
revenue from (90) is more likely of negative sign for high asset endowments s0E.49
B.2 Scenario G
B.2.1 General Equilibrium Price Elasticity of Demand
When accounting for the endogeneity of second-period resource demand, the monopolist
effectively no longer considers just the standard price elasticity Rt,pt from (51) which
measures the reaction of resource demand to changes in the resource price for a given
48See section B.4.3 for a more extensive discussion of the limits of MRNA2 .
49From (90) we know that θ2R + θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 < 0 is a sufficient (but not a necessary) condition for
∂MRNA2
∂K2
∣∣∣
R2,s1E
< 0. However, the analysis in section 3.5 will show that for θ2R + θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 < 0 we
also have MRNA2 < MRGA2 . Therefore, we can also conclude that MRNA2 will unambiguously rise for
high R2 if MRNA2 < MRGA2 .
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capital stock. Instead, we can think of the monopolist now taking into account a “total”
price elasticity based on the total price reaction from (37) and defined as
eR2,p2 =
1
dp2
dR2
R2
p2
= R2,p2
1 + R2,p2 ∂p2∂K2
dK2
dR2
R2
p2
= − σ
1− θ2R − θ2K dK2dR2 R2K2
(92)
which includes the simultaneously induced change in capital accumulation on resource
demand. Since in general equilibrium any postponement of extraction induces a down-
ward shift in (inverse) resource demand in addition to the standard own-price effect
as long as dK2
dR2
< 0, the price elasticity of second period resource demand decreases in
value ceteris paribus when we let the monopolist become aware of the total price re-
action.50 Just as in a static/one-period analysis of monopolistic supply, second period
resource supply thereby becomes less attractive from the monopolist’s perspective and
the monopolist starts to shift resources to the first period.
Correspondingly, we may restate Hotelling rule (68) in terms of price elasticities as
(1 + iG∗2 )pG∗1
[
1 + 1
R1,p1(RG∗1 , RG∗2 )
]
= pG∗2
[
1 + 1
eR2,p2(RG∗1 , RG∗2 )
]
By the comparison with the standard Hotelling rule (49) it is obvious that the addiction
motive is introduced by the term θ2K dK2dR2
R2
K2
in the total price elasticity. The strength of
the addiction motive’s effect on the extraction path, crucially depends on the sensitivity
of the second period capital stock to changes in the extraction pattern which is measured
by the elasticity of the capital stock with respect to a postponement of extraction dK2
dR2
K2
R2
in (92).
50Note that the denominator in (92) is greater than in (51) so that eR2,p2 is lower in value than
R2,p2 for any extraction path (R1, R2).
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B.2.2 Slope of Marginal Revenue Curve
While the marginal revenue curve of period 1 does not differ from scenario N and is
falling monotonously, the slope of the marginal revenue curve in period 2 is ambiguous:
dMRG2
dR2
= ∂MR
N
2
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
K2
+ ∂MR
N
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
dK2
dR2
+ ∂p2
∂K2
dK2
dR2
+ ∂
2p2
∂K2∂R2
R2
dK2
dR2
+ ∂
2p2
(∂K2)2
R2
(
dK2
dR2
)2
+ ∂p2
∂K2
R2
d2K2
(dR2)2
= dMR
N
2
dR2
+ 2− σ
σ
F2KR
[(
θ2R − 1− σ2− σ
)
+
(
θ2K − 12− σ
)
R2
K2
dK2
dR2
]
dK2
dR2
+ F2RKR2
d2K2
(dR2)2
(93)
with dMR
N
2
dR2
from (57) and dp2
dR2
from (37) reveals that the ambiguity arises only from the
term d2K2(dR2)2 whereas all the other terms are analytically of negative sign for
dK2
dR2
< 0 and
MRN2 > 0.51
B.2.3 Scenario G vs. Competition - Reversal of Conservationist Bias
The addiction motive may even reverse the naive conservationist bias (for σ < 1), if
it is sufficiently strong. To show this assume that the optimal competitive extraction
path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) – even with capital accumulation – falls over time so that RC∗1 > RC∗2
and the standard monopolist chooses a more conservationist extraction policy due to
the more price elastic demand in the second period.52 The addiction motive will induce
the monopolist to speed up extraction compared to the competitive outcome if the
evaluation of the Hotelling rule (68) for the competitive extraction path yields
(1 + iC∗2 )MRN1 (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) > MRG2 (RC∗1 , RC∗2 )
By using the definition of the respective marginal revenue from (46) and (69) as well as
the definition of the (standard partial) price elasticity of demand in (51), this inequality
51MRN2 > 0 ensures that
∂MRN2
∂R2
< 0 (cf. (47)), ∂MR
N
2
∂K2
> 0 (cf. (48)) and
(
θ2R − 1−σ2−σ
)
+(
θ2K − 12−σ
)
R2
K2
dK2
dR2
> 0 because by combining θ2R > 1 − σ from MRN2 > 0 and θ2R + θ2K < 1
by the Euler theorem we have θ2R > 1+σ2−σ >
1
2−σ and θ2K <
1
2−σ at least for σ < 2.
52i.e. we have |R2,p2 | > |R1,p1 | for the falling competitive extraction path due to σ < 1 and (52)
and (54).
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will only arise if
−dK2
dR2
RC∗2
K2(RC∗1 , RC∗2 )
>
θ2R(RC∗1 , RC∗2 )− θ1R(RC∗1 , RC∗2 )
θ2K(RC∗1 , RC∗2 )
(94)
Note that the right side is positive because θ2R(RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) > θ1R(RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) directly
follows from the definition of the price elasticity of demand (51) and |2| > |1| which
ensures that the naive monopolist indeed postpones extraction compared to the com-
petitive outcome. For ση > 1, we know that the left side is also positive according to
(41). Obviously, the addiction motive will induce the monopolist to speed up extraction
compared to competitive extraction only for a sufficiently high sensitivity of second pe-
riod capital stock to changes in the resource extraction path which is measured in (94)
by the elasiticity of the second-period capital stock with respect to a postponement of
extraction53 if demand is not iso-elastic and σ < 1. Note that the sensitivity of second
period capital stock does in the end depend on the consumption preferences in both
countries and the production structure given by the CES-technology (1).
From the definitions of the standard partial price elasticity (51) and of the total price
elasticity (92) it readily can be seen that such a sufficiently high sensitivity of the second
period capital stock as defined by (94) in turn implies that second period demand is
less price elastic in terms of the total price elasticity eR2,p2 than first period demand for
the competitive supply path (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ), i.e. that∣∣∣eR2,p2(RC∗1 , RC∗2 )∣∣∣ < ∣∣∣R1,p1(RC∗1 , RC∗2 )∣∣∣
At the same time, we still have |R2,p2| > |R1,p1 | for (RC∗1 , RC∗2 ) due to our assumption
that the naive monopolist postpones extraction compared to the competitive market
solution (thereby introducing the conservationist bias).
53i.e. a change in the resource extraction path by shifting resources from the first to the second
period.
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B.3 Scenario GA
B.3.1 Sign and Slope of the General Equilibrium Feedback Effect Ψ
The total general equilibrium feedback effect Ψ from (71) changes with the extraction
path ambiguously. This can be observed from the total derivative
dΨ
dR2
= ∂Ψ
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
K2,s1E
+ ∂Ψ
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,s1E
dK2
dR2
+ ∂Ψ
∂s1E
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,K2
ds1E
dR2
(95)
where we use for abbreviation
∂Ψ
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
K2,s1E
= 2− σ
σ
F2KR
[
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
− 1− σ2− σ
(
1− s1E
K2
)]
= ∂MR
NA
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,s1E
(96)
according to (90),
∂Ψ
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,s1E
= 1
σ
F2K
K2
[2− σ
σ
(
θ2K − 12− σ
)(
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
)
+ (1− θ2K) s1E
K2
]
(97)
which implies that if either σ ≥ 2 or σ < 2 and θ2K < 12−σ , then ∂Ψ∂K2
∣∣∣
R2,s1E
> 0 whenever
∂Ψ
∂R2
∣∣∣
K2,s1E
< 0. Note that θ2K < 12−σ holds due to the Euler theorem at least as long as
MRN2 > 0.
Finally we have
∂Ψ
∂s1E
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,K2
= F2KK (98)
The first two terms in (95) are ambiguous because θ2R + θ2K s1EK2 − s1EK2 or, equivalently,
Ψ is of ambiguous sign, in general.54 The last term is ambiguous due to the generally
ambiguous savings reaction (see section A.2.3). In general, therefore, Ψ may change sign
54Ψ may also be stated as
Ψ = F2K
σ
[
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
]
by use of the CES-technology (1) and the resource and capital market equilibrium conditions pt = FtR
and it = FtK . Ψ > 0 therefore also implies that the share of total output which country E can capture
as factor remuneration exceeds its share in the second period capital stock, and the other way round.
Moreover, note that θ2K − 12−σ < 0 for σ < 2 and MR2 > 0 from (59).
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when redistributing resources from one period to another so that MRGA2 and MRNA2
intersect.
B.3.2 Slope of MRGA2
Recall that by (44), (59) and (71) we have
MRGA2 = MRNA2 + Ψ
dK2
dR2
By using (67) and (95) we get (75) which we decompose by noting the di2
dR2
= F2KR +
F2KK
dK2
dR2
according to (38). Using our previous results in sections B.3.1 and B.1.2 we
then can state the following:
dMRGA2
dR2
= dMR
NA
2
dR2
+ dΨ
dR2
dK2
dR2
+ Ψ d
2K2
(dR2)2
= ∂MR
NA
2
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
K2,s1E︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 for MRNA2 > 0 ((89))
+ ∂MR
NA
2
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,s1E︸ ︷︷ ︸
1 from (90)
dK2
dR2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂Ψ
∂R2
∣∣∣∣∣
K2,s1E︸ ︷︷ ︸
2 from (96)
dK2
dR2︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ ∂Ψ
∂K2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2,s1E︸ ︷︷ ︸
3 from (97)
(
dK2
dR2
)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ di2
dR2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 from (38)
ds1E
dR2︸ ︷︷ ︸
R0
+ Ψ︸︷︷︸
R0 from (71)
d2K2
(dR2)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
R0
(99)
Overall, the total derivative is of ambiguous sign. In addition to the terms where we
already indicated the ambiguity note that, even though the omniscient monopolist will
never choose a supply path for which MRGAt < 0, MRNA2 > 0 does not necessarily hold
if Ψ < 0 (see (70) and (71)). Moreover, the terms 1, 2 and 3 are generally of ambiguous
sign due to (90) in appendix B.1.2 and (96) and (97) from appendix B.3.1. Finally,
the overall ambiguity of the total derivative above is also due to the ambiguous savings
reaction ds1E
dR2
from (42), which also complicated the analysis in scenario NA (see (67)),
and due to the ambiguity of d2K2(dR2)2 , which is already pointed out in section 3.4 when
we analyze the slope of the addiction-motivated monopolist’s marginal revenue curve
of the second period (see (93) in section B.2.2).
Upward Sloping of MRGA2 The ambiguity of (75) is also illustrated by the numeri-
cal simulation example in section 4 as MRGA2 is obviously not downward sloping for all
feasible extraction paths but sharply increasing at the right end of the diagram when
the resource stock is quite unevenly allocated to the second period. A similar but much
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attenuated upward sloping is observed for MRNA2 , too. We argue in appendix B.1.2
that such an increase of MRNA2 crucially depends on the effect which the capital accu-
mulation dynamics has on the total derivative (67) and on the partial equilibrium asset
motive, in particular. In principle, the same reasoning also applies for the omniscient
monopolist’s scenario at hand. Nevertheless, as the comparison of (75) with (67) shows
there are some additional elements to account for which obviously must give rise to the
much more pronounced increase of MRGA2 in figure 1.
From (90) and (96) we know that the terms 1 and 2 are identical and therefore always
have the same sign. Moreover, if either σ ≥ 2 or σ < 2 and θ2K < 12−σ we know from
(97) that 3 will be positive whenever 1 and 2 are negative. Note that in this case, all
three terms 1, 2, 3 positively contribute to the overall total derivative of MRGA2 as we
assume dK2
dR2
< 0 (see section 2.4.4). In appendix B.1.2 we identify (91)
θ2R + θ2K
s1E
K2
− s1E
K2
≤ 0↔ Ψ ≤ 0
as a sufficient (and independent of σ) condition for 1 (and 2) being negative which is
also of crucial importance for an upward sloping of MRNA2 . Thus, as soon as MRGA2 ≥
MRNA2 which implies Ψ ≤ 0 according to (70) and (71), the terms 1 and 2 are negative,
3 is positive and MRGA2 is likely to increase in R2.
Since savings s1E are a linear increasing function of capital endowment s0E ceteris
paribus (see appendix B.1.1) whereas overall capital accumulation does not depend
on the endowment distribution, this condition is more likely to hold if we redistribute
capital endowment to country E, i.e. for higher capital endowment s0E, because θ2K −
1 < 0 due to the Euler theorem and the left side of condition (91) decreases with s0E
ceteris paribus. Moreover, if the sufficient condition (91) holds, note that the terms 2
and 3 positively add to the derivative of MRNA2 in (67). Therefore, if MRNA2 indeed
increases which is according to appendix B.1.2 mainly due to the capital feedback effect
dominating, MRGA2 tends to increase more strongly.
Nevertheless, the analytical assessment of the total derivative of MRGA2 is rather re-
stricted due to the ambiguous savings reaction ds1E
dR2
(see appendix A.2.3) and the entirely
ambiguous second derivative of the relationship between capital accumulation and the
extraction path, as we pointed out in section 3.4.3. Note that the influence of the
savings reaction is strengthened in (99) compared to the total derivative MRNA2 , be-
cause we have di2
dR2
instead of F2KR in (67) and di2dR2 > F2KR according to (38). Thus,
if households in country E react to a postponement of extraction with an increase in
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savings, the savings reaction works towards an upward sloping of MRGA2 as well as of
MRNA2 , but the effect is again stronger for MRGA2 . If capital accumulation increasingly
falls with R2 and d
2K2
(dR2)2 , the last term in (99) contributes to an overall positive sign as
soon as Ψ < 0 or condition (91) holds so that the upward sloping tendency for MRGA2
arising from the terms 1, 2 and 3 is further strengthened.
Given the decomposition in (99) and the analytical assessment, we can discuss the sharp
increase of MRGA2 in our numerical example at right end of figure 1. First, note MRNA2
increases, too, and thatMRGA2 > MRNA2 for R2 → R¯. Since therefore Ψ < 0, condition
(91) holds and the terms 1, 2 and 3 all positively contribute to the total derivative for
high R2. Moreover, whereas the savings reaction is mostly positive but rather weak
according to figure 5, the interest rate reaction now directly mirrors the increasingly
negative sensitivity of capital accumulation and therefore sharply increases for high R2
as can be observed from figure 4. Finally, figure 4 also illustrates that we have d2K2(dR2)2 < 0
for high R2 which in turn implies that the last term in (99) also positively contributes
to the total derivative because Ψ < 0 due to (91). In the numerical example, all the
additional effects in (99) compared to (67) therefore work towards an upward sloping
of MRGA2 which correspondingly increases stronger than MRNA2 .
B.4 Existence of Equilibrium
To proof the existence of an overall equilibrium outcome in the respective scenario, we
evaluate the left and the right side of the respective Hotelling condition for the limiting
cases R2 → 0 and R2 → R¯ thereby taking into account that the conditional market
equilibrium holds. The latter implies that on the one hand the resource constraint (17)
binds and, on the other hand, that in every scenario the capital market equilibrium
represented by (K2, i2) is a function of the resource extraction path only.
B.4.1 Limiting Behavior of Capital Market Equilibrium
Due to the assumption of symmetric homothetic preferences, the functional relationship
between capital accumulation or the interest rate and the resource supply path is the
same across all scenarios and the competitive case. Since aggregate savings cannot
exceed aggregate income in period 1, we have
lim
R2→0
K2(R2) = Kmax2 < F (R¯,K1) +K1 (100)
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and
lim
R2→R¯
K2(R2) = Kmin2 < K1 (101)
where the inequality signs are due to the strict concavity of the period utility functions
u(ct). Note that for σ ≤ 1 we also can conclude that Kmin2 > 0 as there would be
no production in period 2 otherwise. For σ > 1, when the a positive capital input no
longer is necessary for final goods’ production, the lower bound on capital accumulation
is, however, Kmin2 ≥ 0.
As i2 = F2K(R2, K2) according to (7) in the conditional market equilibrium, the CES
technology (1) and (100) imply that55
lim
R2→0
i2(R2, K2) = lim
R2→0
γA
[
γ + λ
(
R2
K2
)α
+ (1− γ − λ)
(
L
K2
)α] 1−αα
=

0 for σ ≤ 1
γA
[
γ + (1− γ − λ)
(
L
Kmax2
)α] 1−αα = i2(0, Kmax2 ) for σ > 1
(102)
due to the finite upper and lower bounds ofK2 according to (100) and (101) and because
we have for a given and exogenous capital stock
lim
Rt→0
FtK
∣∣∣∣
Kt
= lim
Rt→0
γA
[
γ + λ
(
Rt
Kt
)α
+ (1− γ − λ)
(
L
Kt
)α] 1−αα ∣∣∣∣∣∣
Kt
=

0 for σ ≤ 1
γA
[
γ + (1− γ − λ)
(
L
Kt
)α] 1−αα for σ > 1
This also implies, that for R2 → R¯, i2 approaches some positive upper bound for both
σ ≤ 1 as well as for σ > 1:
lim
R2→R¯
i2(R2, K2) = γA
[
γ + λ
(
R¯
Kmin2
)α
+ (1− γ − λ)
(
L
Kmin2
)α] 1−αα
= i2(R¯,Kmin2 ) < +∞
(103)
55Note that α < 0 implies σ < 1 and vice versa.
85
Furthermore, we know that
di2
dR2
=
F2KR + F2KK dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
1− F2KK dK2di2
∣∣∣
R2
> 0
with dK2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
from (28) and dK2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
from (27) in the conditional market equilibrium (i.e.
Ks2 = Kd2 ). We first consider the limits of the components of di2dR2 for R2 → 0, separately,
thereby again taking into account that K2 → Kmax2 <∞ from (100):
• for F2KR:
lim
R2→0
F2KR = lim
R2→0
1
σ
F2R
K2
γ
γ + λ
(
R2
K2
)α
+ (1− γ − λ)
(
L
K2
)α
=
0 for σ < 1∞ for σ ≥ 1
(104)
• for F2KK :
lim
R2→0
F2KK = lim
R2→0
1
σ
F2K
K2
 γ
γ + λ
(
R2
K2
)α
+ (1− γ − λ)
(
L
K2
)α − 1

=

0 for σ ≤ 1
1
σ
γA
[
γ+(1−γ−λ)
(
L
Kmax2
)α] 1−αα
Kmax2
 γ
γ+(1−γ−λ)
(
L
Kmax2
)α − 1
 for σ > 1
(105)
• for dK2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
:
lim
R2→0
dK2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
= lim
R2→0
− [β(1 + i2)]
− 1
η p2 + p1
1 + (1 + i2) [β(1 + i2)]−
1
η
=

−β−
1
η Aλ
1
α+F1R(R¯,K1)
1+β−
1
η
> −∞ for σ < 1
−∞ for σ ≥ 1
(106)
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• for dK2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
:
lim
R2→0
dK2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
= lim
R2→0
1
η(1 + i2)
F2 +K2
1 + i2 + [β(1 + i2)]
1
η
=

1
η
Kmax2
1+β
1
η
< +∞ for σ ≤ 1
1
η(1+i2(0,Kmax2 ))
F2(0,Kmax2 )+Kmax2
1+i2(0,Kmax2 )+[β(1+i2(0,Kmax2 ))]
1
η
< +∞ for σ > 1
(107)
From the behavior of these components of di2
dR2
we can conclude that
lim
R2→0
di2
dR2
=
0 for σ ≤ 1∞ for σ > 1 (108)
Moreover, from (39) we have dK2
dR2
= dK2
dR2
∣∣∣
i2
+ dK2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
di2
dR2
so that
lim
R2→0
dK2
dR2
=

limR2→0 dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
= −β−
1
η Aλ
1
α+F1R(R¯,K1)
1+β−
1
η
> −∞ for σ < 1
limR2→0 dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
= −∞ for σ = 1
∈
[
limR2→0 dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
; 0
]
for σ > 1
(109)
as long as ση ≥ 1 and dK2
dR2
< 0 for all R2. Recall that limR2→0 di2dR2 = 0 for σ ≤ 1
according to (108). The interval for σ > 1 is due to the fact that limR2→0 dK2dR2
∣∣∣
i2
= −∞
according to (106) but limR2→0 dK2di2
∣∣∣
R2
di2
dR2
= +∞ according to (107) and (108).
B.4.2 Scenario N: Existence of Equilibrium
For the limiting behavior of the marginal revenue from (46) for Rt → 0, we have
lim
Rt→0
MRNt = lim
Rt→0
pt
σ
[θtR − (1− σ)] = lim
Rt→0
FtR(Rt, Kt)
=
Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
∞ for σ ≥ 1
(110)
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because θtR = ptRtFt , pt = FtR according to (6) in the conditional market equilibrium and
FtR =
∂Ft
∂Rt
= λAα
(
Ft
Rt
)1−α
Note that the limits for Rt → 0 do not depend on the capital stock Kt for σ < 1 as well
as for σ ≥ 1. Since K2 is bounded from above according to (100), the limits of MRNt or
FtR derived in (110) therefore also hold for the second period in the conditional market
equilibrium where the capital stock increases for R2 → 0 (cf. (41)).
Evaluating the left side of Hotelling condition (45) for R2 → R¯ and correspondingly
R1 → 0 therefore yields
lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRN1 =
(1 + i2(R¯,K
min
2 ))Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
∞ for σ ≥ 1
For the right side, we get
lim
R2→R¯
MRN2 = MRN2 (R¯,Kmin2 ) < Aλ
1
α
where the inequality follows from dMR
N
2
dR2
< 0 in (57).
In contrast, for R2 → 0 and R1 → R¯ we get for the left side
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRN1 =
MR
N
1 (R¯,K1) for σ ≤ 1
(1 + i2(0, Kmax2 ))MRN1 (R¯,K1) for σ > 1
and for the right side
lim
R2→0
MRN2 =
Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
∞ for σ ≥ 1
This implies that for R2 → 0 and R1 → R¯ the right side of Hotelling condition always
exceeds the left side whereas the opposite holds true for R2 → R¯ and R1 → 0. Thus,
there necessarily exists an interior solution for which the equilibrium resource extraction
fulfills Hotelling condition (45). Moreover, since both sides of the Hotelling condition
are monotonously falling in the resource supply of the respective period according to
(56) and (57), this equilibrium solution is unique.
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B.4.3 Scenario NA: Existence of Equilibrium
With the monopolist pursuing the asset motive in scenario NA, we first have to derive
the limits for the second period asset holdings. Although the influence of shifting re-
sources to or from the second period is generally of ambiguous sign due to counteracting
income and substitution effects, savings s1E approach some finite limits for R2 → 0
lim
R2→0
s1E(y1E, pi2E, i2) = s1E
(
y1E(R¯,K1, s0E), pi2E(0, Kmax2 ), i2(0, Kmax2 )
)
< y1E(R¯,K1, s0E) < F1(R¯,K1) +K1
(111)
Note that for σ ≤ 1, we have pi2E(0, Kmax2 ) = 0 and i2(0, Kmax2 ) = 0. Similarly, for
R2 → R¯ we get
lim
R2→R¯
s1E(y1E, pi2E, i2) = s1E
(
y1E(0, K1, s0E), pi(R¯,Kmin2 ), i2(R¯,Kmin2 )
)
< F1(0, K1) +K1
(112)
where y1E(0, K1, s0E) = s0E and F1(0, K1) = 0 for σ ≤ 1.
From (59) we know that MRNAt = MRNt +FtKRs(t−1)E. Since s1E and K2 according to
(101) are bounded for R2 → 0, we can conclude that
lim
Rt→0
MRNAt = lim
Rt→0
MRNt + lim
Rt→0
FtKRs(t−1)E
= lim
Rt→0
MRNt + lim
Rt→0
1
σ
FtR
s(t−1)E
Kt
γ
γ + λ
(
Rt
Kt
)α
+ (1− γ − λ)
(
L
Kt
)α
=
Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
∞ for σ ≥ 1
(113)
holds for both periods according to (110) because the limits are independent of K2 and
s1E.
Evaluating the left side of Hotelling condition (58) therefore gives for R2 → R¯
lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRNA1 =

(
1 + i2(R¯,Kmin2 )
)
Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
∞ for σ ≥ 1
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and for R2 → 0
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRNA1 =
MR
NA
1 (R¯,K1, s0E) for σ ≤ 1
(1 + i2(0, Kmax2 ))MRNA1 (R¯,K1, s0E) for σ > 1
where MRNA1 (R¯,K1, s0E) is some finite value which may be positive or negative and
i2(0, Kmax2 ) = 0 for σ ≤ 1 according to (102). Since the right side of (58) unambiguously
falls in R1 according to (66), we also can conclude that
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRNA1 = (1 + i2(0, Kmax2 ))MRNA1 (R¯,K1, s0E) < lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRNA1
for all σ > 0.
Combining this observation and with the limit of the right side of the Hotelling condition
(58) for R2 → 0 from (113) we have
Aλ
1
α = lim
R2→0
MRNA2 > MR
NA
1 (R¯,K1) = lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRNA1 for σ ≤ 1
and
∞ = lim
R2→0
MRNA2 > (1 + i2(0, Kmax2 ))MRNA1 (R¯,K1) = lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRNA1 for σ > 1
This implies that right side always exceeds the left side for R2 → 0.
For R2 → R¯, the right side approaches some, again positive or negative, finite value
lim
R2→R¯
MRNA2 (K2, R2, s1E) = MRNA2 (Kmin2 , R¯, s1E) for all σ > 0
with Kmin2 from (101).
In contrast to the left side, MRNA2 does not necessarily fall in R2 due to the influence of
the feedback effect from capital accumulation on the asset motive in the second period
as (67) demonstrates. Nevertheless, we can show by contradiction that
MRNA2 < p2(R2, K2)
holds for all feasible extraction paths R2 ≤ R¯, because due to the Euler theorem
θ2R + θ2K s1EK2 < 1. However, since
dp2
dR2
< 0 from (37), this implies that even though
MRNA2 might increase in R2 given that the conditional market equilibrium holds we
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necessarily have for all σ > 0
lim
R2→R¯
MRNA2 < p2(R¯,Kmin2 ) < Aλ
1
α ≤ lim
R2→0
MRNA2 ≤ lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRNA1
Thus, the right side of Hotelling condition (58) is necessarily lower for R2 → R¯ than
the left side whereas for R2 → 0 the right side always exceeds the left side. This implies
that there must be at least one feasible extraction path within the given resource con-
straint for which the equilibrium condition (58) holds. Since the right side of Hotelling
condition (58) monotonously falls in R1, this proves the existence of an interior equi-
librium solution in scenario NA for which the Hotelling condition and the conditional
market equilibrium hold. In contrast to scenario N , this equilibrium solution does not
have to be unique due to the eventually upward sloping of the MRNA2 . Referring to
the stability criterion laid out in section 3.1, however, we can also conclude that there
necessarily must be at least one stable equilibrium outcome.
B.4.4 Scenario G: Existence of Equilibrium
The first period’s marginal revenues in the scenarios G and N are identical (MRG1 =
MRN1 ) (cf. (68) and (49)) and are strictly monotonic decreasing in R1. The existence of
an equilibrium in scenario N is given (cf. B.4.2 above), and in period 2 MRG2 < MRN2
necessarily holds. Therefore, in scenario G an interior equilibrium exists, too, if we
can show that MRG2 (R2 = 0) > MRG1 (R2 = 0). We again look at the limits of the
components of MRG2 = MRN2 + F2KRR2 dK2dR2 .
For F2KRR2:
lim
R2→0
F2KRR2 = lim
R2→0
[
1
σ
λAα
[
F2
R2
]−α
F2K
]
= 0
for all σ with
lim
R2→0
[
F2
R2
]−α
=

1
Aαλ
for σ < 1
1 for σ = 1
0 for σ > 1
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Case 1) σ < 1: As limR2→0 dK2dR2 is a constant, we get
lim
R2→0
[
F2KRR2
dK2
dR2
]
= 0 · const. = 0
And as a result
lim
R2→0
MRG2 = lim
R2→0
MRN2 = Aλ
1
α
Case 2) σ = 1: In the Cobb-Douglas case we have
lim
R2→0
[
F2KRR2
dK2
dR2
]
= lim
R2→0
[
λγA2α
σK2
F2
dK2
dR2
]
= lim
R2→0
[
λγA2α
σK2
F2(−C0F2R + C1)
]
= lim
R2→0
[−C2R2λ−12 ] =

0 for λ > 0.5
−C2 for λ = 0.5
−∞ for λ < 0.5
with C0, C1, C2 being positive constants in the limit. For the other part of MRG2 we
have from (110)
lim
R2→0
[p2 + F2RRR2]
= +∞
For the sum of both parts, i.e. for the limit of MRG2 for R2 → 0 we get
lim
R2→0
MRG2
= lim
R2→0
[
p2 + F2RRR2 + F2KRR2
dK2
dR2
]
= lim
R2→0
[
λ2AKγ2R
λ−1
2
]
+ lim
R2→0
[−C2R2λ−12 ]
= lim
R2→0
MRN2
= +∞
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For λ ≥ 0.5, F2KRR2 dK2dR2 approaches a constant or zero, so that limR2→0MRN2 = +∞
dominates. For λ < 0.5 the term p2 + F2RRR2 dominates in the limit too, because its
exponent has a higher absolute value:
|λ− 1| > |2λ− 1|
Case 3) σ > 1: In the Cobb-Douglas case above we had (cf. (101))
lim
R2→0
dK2
dR2
= lim
R2→0
dK2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
+ dK2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
di2
dR2
= lim
R2→0
dK2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
= −∞
But this negative force was too weak to dominate limR2→0MRN2 = +∞. In the following
we first show, that the same holds true for σ > 1: With limR2→0 F2R2 = +∞ we have for
the addition motive in the limit
lim
R2→0
F2KRR2
dK2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
= lim
R2→0
F2KRR2 (−C3p2)
= lim
R2→0
−C3 1
σ
F2KF2R
F2
R2F2R
= lim
R2→0
−C3 1
σ
F2Kλ
2A2α
[
F2
R2
]1−2α
= lim
R2→0
−C4
[
F2
R2
]1−2α
=

−∞ for 0 < α < 0.5
−const. for α = 0.5
0 for 0.5 < α < 1
with C3, C4 being further constants in the limit. The limit of the marginal revenue
according to (110) is
lim
R2→0
p2 + F2RRR2
= +∞
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Putting both components together we get
lim
R2→0
[
p2 + F2RRR2 + F2KRR2
dK2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
]
= lim
R2→0
[
MRN2 − C4
[
F2
R2
]1−2α]
= lim
R2→0
MRN2
= +∞
for all α and limR2→0MRN2 indeed dominates the rest, because its exponent is again
higher:
1− α > 1− 2α
Now the additional positive term dK2
di2
∣∣∣
R2
di2
dR2
further attenuates the force towards −∞.
Moreover, this additional positive force grows infinitely itself for R2 → 0
lim
R2→0
[
dK2
di2
∣∣∣∣∣
R2
di2
dR2
]
= +∞
Therefore, limR2→0MRN2 = +∞ will continue to dominate and we finally get also for
σ > 1
lim
R2→0
MRG2
= lim
R2→0
[
MRN2 + F2KRR2
dK2
dR2
∣∣∣∣∣
i2
]
= lim
R2→0
MRN2
= +∞
Thus, MRG2 (R2 = 0) > MRG1 (R2 = 0) always holds and we necessarily have at least
one stable (cf. stability criterion in section 3.1) interior equilibrium. In case, that an
upward sloping part of MRG2 indeed arises and gives way to multiple equilibria (which
we cannot totally exclude, although we did not observe any), all of these must be interior
solutions.
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B.4.5 Scenario GA: Existence of Equilibrium
According to (44), we haveMRGA1 = MRNA1 andMRGA2 = MRNA2 +ΨdK2dR2 with Ψ from
(71). Thus, according to (113) we have for the first period
lim
R1→0
MRGA1 = lim
R1→0
MRNA1 =
Aλ
1
α for σ ≤ 1
∞ for σ > 1
In contrast, for the second period we get
lim
R2→0
MRGA2 = lim
R2→0
MRNA2 + lim
R2→0
ΨdK2
dR2
(114)
where the second limit is given by
lim
R2→0
ΨdK2
dR2
= lim
R2→0
∂p2
∂K2
R2
dK2
dR2
+ lim
R2→0
∂i2
∂K2
s1E
dK2
dR2
Regarding the first limit, we can refer to the discussion of the existence of an equilibrium
solution for scenario G in section B.4.4 and conclude given (113) that
lim
R2→0
MRG2 = lim
R2→0
MRN2 + lim
R2→0
∂p2
∂K2
R2
dK2
dR2
= lim
R2→0
MRNA2 + lim
R2→0
∂p2
∂K2
R2
dK2
dR2
Regarding the second component of Ψ, we have
lim
R2→0
∂i2
∂K2
s1E = lim
R2→0
F2KKs1E
=
0 for σ < 1F2KK(0, Kmax2 )s1E (y1E(R¯), pi2E(0, Kmax2 ), i2(0, Kmax2 )) for σ ≥ 1
according to (105) and due to s1E being bounded according to (111). Note that the
limit for σ ≥ 1 is some negative but finite value.
However, given that dK2
dR2
< 0 for all feasible R2, we can combine these results and
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conclude that the right side of (43) for R2 → 0 goes to
lim
R2→0
MRGA2 = lim
R2→0
MRNA2 + lim
R2→0
∂p2
∂K2
R2
dK2
dR2
+ lim
R2→0
F2KKs1E
dK2
dR2
=
Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
+∞ for σ ≥ 1
Following the same reasoning as in section B.4.3, this implies that the right side of
Hotelling condition (43) necessarily exceeds the left side for R2 → 0 and R1 → R¯, i.e.
we have
lim
R2→0
(1 + i2)MRGA1 = (1 + i2(0, Kmax2 ))MRNA1 (R¯,K1) < lim
R2→0
MRGA2
with i2(0, Kmax2 ) from (102).
For R2 → R¯, the left side of Hotelling condition (43) approaches
lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRNA1 =
(1 + i2(R¯,K
min
2 ))Aλ
1
α for σ < 1
+∞ for σ ≥ 1
according to (103) and (113). However, we know from the discussion of (75) that
the right side may increase with shifting resources to the second period. Moreover, in
contrast to scenario NA, for which we could show in section B.4.3 that the eventually
increasing right side of Hotelling condition (58) is bounded above by F2R, MRGA2 might
even exceed F2R. Thus, we generally cannot exclude
lim
R2→R¯
MRGA2 > lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRGA1
Since in this case we may haveMRGA2 > (1+ i2)MRGA1 for all feasible extraction paths,
a corner solution may arise where the monopolist extracts the resource just in period 2
and the Hotelling condition (43) does not hold. If, however,
lim
R2→R¯
MRGA2 < lim
R2→R¯
(1 + i2)MRGA1
there must be at least one stable and interior equilibrium solution defined by the
Hotelling condition (43) as the right side necessarily exceeds the left side for R2 → 0
and as we know from (66) that the left side of the Hotelling condition unambiguously
falls in R1 even when taking into account the resource constraint.
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